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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate near
the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the inflation
forecasts prepared by the Economic Analysis and Research and Financial, as well as the macroeconomic developments
underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, with partial updates to the forecasts also prepared twice a year.
The forecasts of the Economic Analysis and Research and Financial Analysis are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in
producing its forecasts, the Directorate assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of economic variables
exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Economic Analysis and Research and Financial Analysis
Department under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project was managed by Mihály András Kovács,
Deputy Head of Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán Gyenes, Gergely Kiss and Barnabás Virág. The Report was
approved for publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report also include: Péter Bauer, Szilárd Benk, Gyõzõ Eppich, Péter Gál, Zoltán Gyenes, Mihály
Hoffman, Áron Horváth, Éva Kaponya, Gergely Kiss, András Komáromi, Mihály András Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Zsuzsa
Munkácsi, Márton Peresztegi, István Schindler, Róbert Szegedi, Róbert Szemere, Tímea Várnai, Barnabás Virág. Other
contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics Analysis and Research
and the Financial Analysis and the Financial Stability Department.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 5
November and 26 November 2007. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the
Economics Analysis and Research and the Financial Analysis Department and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary
Council or the MNB.
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Under the assumption of no change in the average monetary conditions for
October (i.e. an exchange rate of EUR/HUF 250.8, and a base interest rate of
7.50%), the November 2007 Report projection envisages inflation gradually
declining to nearly 5% in 2008 and to around 3% in 2009, with the rate of
economic growth forecast to remain below 2% this year, and then gradually
edge upward above 3% by 2009.
The Hungarian economy has been hit by a series of cost shocks since the
summer of 2006. The consumer price index was initially pushed up by
increases in tax and contribution rates as well as hikes in administered prices,
linked to fiscal adjustment, and then, from the summer of 2007, by the sharp
rise in unprocessed food prices. The central inflation projection is based on the
assumption that no persistent inflationary pressure will build up in response to
the recent cost shocks. One principal reason for this is that the economy is
likely to grow below capacity over the entire forecast period. In such an
environment, the corporate sector will have only a limited ability to pass cost
increases on to consumers. This, in turn, suggests that firms will only partially
be able to offset lower profit margins, by restraining wage growth and cutting
back employment slightly.
Inflation, however, is likely to decline more slowly than assumed at the time of
the August Report. There are three reasons for this. First, commodity futures
prices and forecasts by international institutions indicate that the rise in
unprocessed food prices will persist for a longer period. Second, wage
adjustment is likely to be more prolonged than previously assumed. In
addition, stronger increases in producer energy prices point to slower
disinflation relative to the August projection.
Data for recent months has dampened the outlook for economic growth.
Although the contractionary effect on domestic demand of the fiscal
adjustment is likely to diminish over time, up to now no signs of a marked
turnaround in economic activity have been observed in the latest data. A
potential worsening in external business conditions may act as a drag on the
pace of domestic recovery over the longer term.
There are significant factors of uncertainty in the current inflation projection.
For example, if the adverse price shocks of the past year feed through to
expectations to a degree, it may point to inflation above the central projection.
In addition, the corporate sector might offset the past declines in profit margins
more aggressively by raising prices. This scenario is particularly likely if the
expansion of economic capacity in the past few years has been slower than
assumed in the central projection, because the current slowdown in growth will
then cause the output gap to be narrower than expected.
By contrast, if economic activity in Europe slows more strongly than expected
due to second-round effects of the crisis on the US sub-prime mortgage market,
and if world commodity prices turn sharply lower, this may lead to inflation
below the central projection. Under this scenario, the rate of Hungarian
economic growth may be much slower than assumed in the central projection.
The current projection is that inflation
will decline more slowly than previously
anticipated; CPI inflation is expected to
be near the target in 2009
The negative cost shocks of the past 
year are unlikely to generate sustained
inflationary pressure, as economic
growth remains well below capacity
The profile for economic growth is
weaker than in the August Report
There are upside risks to inflation; 
and risks to growth are weighted 
to the downside 
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Overview
In sum, there are upside risks to inflation and downside risks to growth,
relative to the current central projection.
The general government deficit on an accrual basis may be lower in both 2007
and 2008 than the level indicated in Hungary’s Convergence Programme of
2006. However based on the main scenario and the asymmetric distribution of
risks with a bias towards a higher deficit, further government actions may be
necessary in order to safely meet the target for 2009.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Inflation fan chart
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further government actions might be
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The forecasts are conditional: the main scenario represents the most probable scenario which applies only if all the
assumptions presented materialise; unless otherwise specified, percentage changes on previous year.)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.2 2.4 6.0 4.6 3.1
Consumer price index 3.6 3.9 7.9 5.0 3.0
Economic growth*
External demand (GDP-based) 2.1 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.9
Fiscal impact on demand2 -0.9 2.6 -3.6 -0.8 -0.1
Household consumption 3.7 1.9 -2.1 0.4 1.6
Gross fixed capital formation 5.3 -2.1 1.7 4.2 5.5
Domestic absorption*** 1.4 0.4 0.0 1.2 3.0
Exports 11.5 17.9 15.1 11.6 10.3
Imports3, *** 6.9 12.4 13.1 10.3 10.2
GDP 4.1 (4.3)** 3.9 (4.0)** 1.6 2.4 3.2
Current account deficit3, ***
As a percentage of GDP 6.8 6.5 5.5 5.3 5.2
EUR billions 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.9 6.1
External financing requirement3, ***
As a percentage of GDP 6.0 5.7 4.3 3.3 2.8
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.8 8.2 8.4 6.5 5.4
Whole-economy employment5 0.0 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.2
Private sector gross average earnings6 6.9 9.4 9.7 7.7 6.8
Private sector employment5 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.0 -0.3
Unit labour costs in the private sector5, 7 2.8 4.7 7.0 4.4 3.0
Household real income 3.6**** -1.5**** -3.0 2.1 2.4
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As a result of uncertainty in the
measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 the actual import figure and current account deficit/external financing requirement may be higher
than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO labour force statistics,
however, due to the change of the method the data is not directly comparable with the previous published one. 
6
Data including the effect of whitening,
consistent with headline CSO data. 
7
Private sector unit labor cost calculated with wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and changed
seasonality of bonuses.
* Our analyses and forecasts are based on the quarterly data of the GDP flash report published by the CSO on 7 September. In the summary table we
have indicated changes in volume during the period in question relying on the same publication. Let us point out, however, that the figures contained
in the CSO publication entitled ‘Gross Domestic Product 2006 (second estimation)’ since published deviates from the numbers shown in this table as
regards certain partial aggregates. For the latter, however, we do not have quarterly data to use for our prognosis.
** Data adjusted for working-day variations are shown in brackets.
*** Our projection for 2007 includes the impact of the Hungarian Army’s Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and increases
community consumption and imports.
**** MNB estimate.
Summary table of the central projection

1. Inflation and its determining factors

Historically low economic growth, uncertain turning
point
In 2007 H1, the Hungarian economy was characterised by a
strong deceleration in growth dynamics. In the second
quarter, growth (adjusted seasonally and for calendar effect)
amounted to 1.6 per cent, resulting in a total 2.1 per cent
expansion for the first six months of the year, compared to
the same period of the previous year.
1
According to the
preliminary Q3 data,
2
economic growth has also continued to
decelerate. However, the slowdown which started at the
beginning of last year seems to come to a halt, as the quarter-
on-quarter growth rate has risen for the first time in the last
one and a half years. This slight turning point is in line with
the recent developments of the main determinants
(consumption, investment) of domestic demand.
Despite the favourable international environment, the
growth trend has been slowing steadily since 2005, and in the
second quarter of the year, it declined to a level which has
not been experienced since the fiscal adjustments in 1995.
The composition of growth is still characterised by different
external and internal developments in economic activity. The
vigorous external economic activity favourably influences
Hungary’s growth opportunities via the rapid increase in
exports, while the main reason for the decelerating economic
growth is still waning domestic demand. This latter is the
consequence of the direct effects of government measures,
reflected in the fall in government consumption, social
transfers and government investment, and of the indirect
effects thereof, which moderate economic growth.
Household consumption and investment demand have
declined as a part of the indirect impacts of fiscal
adjustments, which have reduced households’ disposable
income, and this year’s deterioration in domestic sales
prospects, together with the increase in companies’ tax and
contribution burdens, has also undermined investment by
sectors typically producing and providing services for the
domestic market.
The various sectoral effects of government measures can be
observed on the production side as well. The effects of the
decline of the public sector are significant both in production
and in value added. The output of the public services has
declined in consequence of the adjustment measures.
Meanwhile, the expansion of the private sector has fallen
below 3 per cent. The largest declines in the private sector
were experienced in construction and agricultural activities.
However, the weak performance of construction is also
mainly the result of a reduction in public investment, i.e. the
decrease in infrastructural constructions, though construction
1.1. Real economic activity
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Chart 1-1
Annual and annualised quarterly GDP growth rates
(Seasonally adjusted data)
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Note: The 2007 Q3 data is based on the preliminary data of the CSO.
Chart 1-2
Contribution of the main expenditure side items to
the annual growth of GDP
(Seasonally adjusted data)
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Note: The contributions of changes in inventories are not shown. This item
and the effect of using chain indices may cause the total GDP to differ
from the sum of the contributions.
1 According to raw data, compared to the same period of the previous year, the expansion of the economy amounted to 1.2 per cent and 1.9 per cent in the second
quarter and in the first part of the year, respectively.
2 According to the preliminary GDP growth data published by the CSO, the economy has expanded by 1.2 per cent, adjusted seasonally and for calendar effect, while
the raw data has risen by 1.0 per cent. The margin of error of the statistical estimate’s reliability is ± 0.2 percentage point.
of buildings have also considerably declined.
3
Agricultural
production fell considerably due to the unfavourable weather
conditions. In spite of the small weight of these sectors, both
reduced the dynamics of economic growth significantly. In
addition, the value added of market services was
characterised by a slight decline in growth, which is in line
with the domestic demand reducing effect of real incomes
falling as a result of the fiscal adjustments. These
unfavourable tendencies could only be partly offset by
manufacturing, which is dynamically growing as a
consequence of the favourable external economic
environment.
Hungarian economic growth lags significantly behind its
competitors in the region, and has also been lower than
growth in the Euro Area since end-2006. Hungary’s average
2 percentage point growth surplus vis-à-vis the expansion of
the Euro Area observed in the past turned into a more than 1
percentage point growth deficit in the second quarter. The
main underlying explanation for this performance, which is
unfavourable in international comparison, is the different
dynamics of domestic economic activity. While domestic use
in Hungary fell, mainly as a result of the fiscal adjustments,
domestic use in other countries showed an above-GDP
increase or its magnitude was similar to that.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-3
Value added in the private and public sectors
(Annual growth calculated from seasonally adjusted data)
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Chart 1-4
Economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe and
in Euro Area countries
(Annual growth)
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3 See the Box 1-1 for the details.
4 Sources: monthly survey of the GKI Economic Research Co. and the European Commission.
Value added in construction has been declining for one and a half years,
and thus – despite its relatively low weight of 4-5 per cent as a
proportion of GDP – it has reduced the growth rate of GDP by an
average of one quarter of a percentage point since the beginning of
2006. Therefore, it is worth examining what the underlying reasons for
the very poor performance of the construction sector are, and to what
extent the downturn in this sector can be seen as prolonged.
A combination of several demand and supply factors had an
unfavourable impact on construction; the main underlying reasons are
the fiscal adjustment and the considerable government expenditure
preceding it. The curtailment of government investment had the most
direct negative effect, resulting mainly in the postponement of
infrastructure constructions (roads, bridges, etc.), which constitute half
of total construction output: in the first 8 months of 2007 their volume
dropped by 12.4 per cent compared to the same period of the previous
year. Since early 2006, developments in demand have been mentioned
by the sector’s companies to an increasing extent as a factor limiting
output, while shortages of building materials and means of production
are considered to be much less important problems than before.4
Another, less significant negative demand effect originated from the
drop-off in households’ earlier buoyant desire to buy real estate, heated
by the housing subsidies from the government. This is well reflected by
the decline in the number of new flats handed over since the beginning
Box 1-1: Downturn in the construction sector
INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINING FACTORS
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5 See Gyõzõ Eppich–Szabolcs Lõrincz: Three methods to estimate the distortions of wage statistics caused by ‘whitening’, MNB Occasional Papers 66, October 2007.
6 The sector’s employment data are contradictory: the institutional statistics of the CSO, which are based on company surveys and refer only to companies with more
than 5 employees, show a strong decline, while the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is based on questioning households, indicates a slight increase. However, the
reduction in the number of employed is more in line with the very disadvantageous business conditions of the sector.
of 2005. In addition, fiscal measures, namely the tightening of the
formerly generous housing subsidy system in 2004, also may have had
an indirect contribution.
On the supply side, in terms of construction companies’ means and
costs of operation, the measures by authorities aiming at ‘whitening’
the economy, i.e. tackling the informal economy, may have influenced
construction in an especially unpleasant manner. This was preceded by
the development of an unfavourable structure in this sector from the
outset: according to anecdotal information and wage statistics data,5
illegal employment of employees was rather widespread, and therefore,
the stricter supervisions may have resulted in stronger ‘whitening’ than
in other sectors, resulting in an increase in costs.6 On the other hand, the
oversupply character of the market resulted in low profits and payment
difficulties even before the recent fall. The unfavourable effects are
reflected in the sector’s high bankruptcy rate as well as the historically
low level of its confidence index.
Looking ahead, some of the negative demand effects are expected to
diminish due to an expected upturn in infrastructure investments, co-
financed by the EU. However, taking into account the supply-related
problems as well, on the whole, only a slow and prolonged rise is likely
to follow. One of the reasons why a rapid correction cannot be expected
is that the sector’s confidence index has just slightly increased from its
historically low level, and the value of construction contracts, which
proves to be a relatively good predictor within the year, still continues
to decline strongly.
Chart 1-5
Developments in construction output and value
added
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Chart 1-6
Developments in the components of construction
output
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Chart 1-7
Contracts and confidence index in construction
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Export sales growth is gaining momentum again
The deceleration in the trend of industrial output observed
late last year and early in this year did not continue from the
second quarter, as industrial production regained strength in
mid-2007. The main underlying reason is that the trend of
export sales increased markedly, stimulating domestic
manufacturing output. These developments are in line with
the recovery of Euro Area industrial business activity during
recent months, which also resulted in unchanged high
growth rates of industrial production in the countries of the
region.
In addition to the Euro Area economic activity, which turned
more favourable, structural changes observed in Hungarian
exports in recent years have also had a positive impact on the
increase in export sales. As a result, the share of Central and
Eastern European countries (CEE countries), which have
stronger growth, and non-European – typically developing –
countries increased gradually, to the detriment of sales to the
Euro Area.
The rising dynamics of export sales can be observed in the
developments in foreign trade turnover as well. Following a
slowdown at the beginning of the year, exports of goods have
been increasing dynamically in recent months again.
7
Although this expansion is mainly the result of the favourable
external economic conditions, the export of the corn stocks
used for interventions also contributed to the improvements
in export sales. Annual growth rates have been by 1% higher
due to corn-interventions since last November. Even though
the effect of the intervention on the annualized month-on-
month growth rates has been diminishing since April 2007, it
still influences the year-on-year indices. The effect of the
interventions is even stronger in the development of the trade
balance of goods. Since end-2006, half of its improvement
has been caused by the development of the trade balance of
corn.
At the same time, in terms of the growth prospects of sectors
producing for export, less favourable developments are
looming in the medium term. One of the relevant signs is that
in Germany, which is Hungary’s most important trading
partner, the confidence indicators (IFO indices) describing
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-8
The trend of industrial production in Hungary, 
CEE countries and the Euro Area
(Growth rates compared to the same period of the previous year)
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Chart 1-10
Export and import of goods and import-based
external demand
(Annual growth calculated from trends)
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Chart 1-9
Structure of Hungarian export of goods between
2000 and 2007 Q1-Q2
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7 Although the September 2007 preliminary, current price data shows a moderating trend-dynamics, the direction of the export is somewhat uncertain due to the so
far missing volume and price data.
both the current business situation and the expectations, have
shown a steadily declining trend since early 2007. The US
sub-prime mortgage market turbulence may have played a
role in these developments in the IFO indices. Although its
effect was felt only to a lesser extent in Europe, German
credit institutions were probably more affected than others.
The impact of the potentially unfavourable German and Euro
Area business activity may be mitigated, however, if CEE and
other countries, which play a more and more important role
in Hungary’s foreign trade, continue to enjoy strong
economic growth.
Declining consumption, uncertain turning point in
retail sales and in investments
Developments in households’ consumption/saving behaviour
in 2007 H1 were in line with our expectations regarding
smoothing of consumption. According to our indicators
which capture household purchases, household consumption
expenditures declined to a lesser extent than real incomes.
Households continued to avoid the fall in consumption
following the decline in real incomes by dynamic borrowing.
The result of this was that the sector’s financing capacities fell
to 2 per cent of disposable income.
Retail trade business activity continues to be characterised by
a decline, although the slowdown in sales came to a halt in
the summer months. The underlying reason is that a turning-
point in the declining sales trends was seen in sales of
consumer durables – and within that, in the vehicle market in
particular. Nonetheless, our perception relating to the
turning point is accentuated by a number of additional
factors. Since the beginning of the year, no significant, lasting
improvement was seen in household confidence indices,
which reflect households’ opinions and prospects regarding
the business activity, and this may call into question the
sustained improvement of longer-term income expectations
in the sector and, in parallel with this, that of consumption
demand. During the summer months, we perceived a decline
in the demand for food-like products as a new trend, which
could be a result of the suddenly rising food prices in the past
period, together with a general decline in real incomes.
Government consumption expenditures fell significantly,
despite the fact that obtaining the Gripen aircrafts still
boosted public consumption this year. Social transfers
INFLATION AND ITS DETERMINING FACTORS
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Chart 1-11
IFO and EABCI* confidence indicators
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Chart 1-12
Households’ real income, consumption expenditure
and financial savings
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Chart 1-13
Expansion of retail trade turnover according to main
product groups and developments in the GKI
confidence indices
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reached a substantial fall (around 10 per cent) in the first six
months of the year. The underlying reason is declining
household demand for public services (e.g. in the areas of
public health and education), which is a consequence of the
government’s reform measures, and which was modified in
the direction of a greater decline by a change in the
methodology of the statistics as well.
On the whole, following the overall decline in 2006, the
volume of whole-economy gross fixed capital formation was
characterised by a slight increase in 2007 H1.
8
However, the
nearly static growth masks very different developments. First,
while the investment activity of the corporate sector
strengthened somewhat, household and public sectors’
performances are still weak. Second, momentum in corporate
investment is also generated by only manufacturing, and
within that mainly a very strong sector-specific impact.
9
Not
counting this, the investment growth rates seen in
manufacturing are weaker than those experienced in previous
periods of strong external demand, i.e. the weak propensity
to invest seen in 2005 and 2006 has not disappeared
completely.
One underlying explanation for this may be that, on the one
hand, according to business confidence surveys, the overall
prospects of companies are still not favourable and do not
indicate a strong willingness to invest. On the other hand, the
uncertainty stemming from the economic situation and the
regulatory environment is increasingly perceived as a factor
hindering production.
10
This is exacerbated by the increases
in taxes and contributions related to the adjustment, which
burden labour and capital, as well as the uncertainties (e.g.
expected changes in taxes) still existing in the business
environment. Companies’ cautious behaviour and the
presence of uncertainty factors may also be reflected in the
fact that the strong external demand has been met by a high
level of capacity utilisation rather than by a significant
expansion of capacities.
11
This has allowed for a dynamic
increase in industrial production, despite the moderate
willingness to invest.
Within the scope of public and quasi-fiscal activities (public
services) the reduction of fiscal expenditures may be a
reason for the strong decline in investment. As an indirect
effect of the adjustment, through the weakening income
expectations, a decline was also seen among companies
mainly depending on domestic demand (those producing for
and providing services to the domestic market). Investment
in real estate related to households was characterised by a
positive turn in the first half of the year, but this may merely
be due in large part to the base effect, as a correction of the
decline registered in the second half of the previous year. At
the same time, the sustainability of the uptrend is also
questionable, as we have not found any significant
improvement in household expectations, and, in the past
quarters, a slowdown has been observed in lending for
housing as well. Overall, it may be disquieting with regard to
the investment outlook that following the decline last year,
this year’s more favourable developments cannot yet be
considered to be widespread.
12
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8 Gross fixed capital formation and investment are two different statistics; the former is included in the GDP statistics and extends to a wider range, while a detailed
breakdown at quarterly level is available only in the latter. However, regarding economic developments, both data give in the same conclusions, the magnitude of
their volume changes is usually very similar.
9 The sector-specific impact is a result of the manufacturing of rubber and plastic products, which is in line with press news about large investment by several
companies engaged in rubber production. As Charts 1-14 and 1-15 illustrate, the strong increase in manufacturing investments in 2003 and 2004 was much more
general, and no such strong sector-specific impact similar in magnitude to the current one has been experienced since 2002.
10 Sources: Kopint-Datorg business activity test and the joint survey conducted by GKI and the European Commission among industrial companies.
11 Both the joint survey conducted by GKI and the European Commission and the survey by the Research Institute of Economics and Enterprises indicate a historically
high capacity utilisation among manufacturing companies.
12 A very strong duality can also be observed with regard to the breakdown of investment according to its composition: construction-type investments, relating mainly
to the public sector, showed a strong decline (see Box 1-1), while machinery-investments, relating mainly to the manufacturing industry, exhibited buoyant growth.
Chart 1-14
Breakdown of manufacturing investment according
to sub-sectors
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By early 2007, inventories increased significantly in
distributional services (retail and wholesale trade), in
parallel with the decline in aggregate demand. There may
be two underlying explanations for this: on the one hand,
the slowdown in demand – the negative output gap – may
have been stronger than what was expected by merchants,
and lower-than-planned sales consequently resulted in an
increase in inventories. On the other hand, this may also
indicate that merchants expect a fast rebound from the
weak domestic economic activity, and are stocking up
inventories in order to meet the expected high demand.
However, considering other, unfavourable information
relating to the expectations of the retail trade sector, we
believe that the inventory data probably more likely
reflects the effect of the greater-than-expected downturn in
demand.
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Chart 1-15
Investments* in different sectors and capacity
utilisation in manufacturing 
(MNB-estimates)
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Chart 1-16
Developments in inventories in trade
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Third-quarter data have confirmed our earlier assumptions
from August regarding wage adjustment, namely it appears
that over the short run companies are attempting to restore
their profitability by restraining bonus payments. Two
available sets of employment statistics draw quite different
pictures in respect of the development in employment. It is
important to note, however, that in the market services
sector, which is most strongly affected by the cost shocks and
the weaker domestic demand, we have not seen any
adjustment in the number of employed yet.
Further loosening of the labour market
According to data for 2007 Q2 and Q3, the decline in activity
observed at the beginning of the year came to a halt, and then
started to increase slightly. All this occurred in parallel with
stagnation in whole-economy employment, and thus the
unemployment rate increased, reaching 7.2 per cent
according to seasonally adjusted data. Another aspect also
suggesting a loosening of the labour market is that the
number of vacancies declined while unemployment rose, i.e.
the so-called tightness indicator declined.
13
However, the labour market loosening observable at the
aggregate level cannot be considered as generally valid at the
sectoral level. As we have already pointed out in earlier
analyses, the so-called skill mismatch phenomenon –
stemming mainly from a shortage of skilled labour – can
sometimes be a dominant factor in manufacturing. This is
confirmed by the questionnaire-based economic activity
survey conducted among companies by GKI. According to
the results, a growing share of companies is noting a shortage
of skilled labour as a barrier to increasing production.
Based on the data series it seems that skill mismatch is not a
new phenomenon. This is confirmed by the fact that
historically developments in labour shortage have moved in
close correlation with the demand for labour generated by
the business cycle. There are, however, signs suggesting that
this problem may become more serious than seen in the past.
This may be indicated by the phenomenon that – although
manufacturing production seems to have passed its peak – the
problems resulting from the shortage of skilled labour has not
declined, and that the number of those employed in
manufacturing has not increased significantly.
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1.2. Labour market
13 Similarly to the Bank of England (reference to the paper Cassino, V-Joyce, M.: ‘Forecasting inflation using labour market indicators’ BOE Working Paper No. 195.) we
introduced a new indicator which measures the tightness of the labour market. It can be defined as the quotient of the number of vacancies and the number of
unemployed. The indicator is able to take into account the labour supply changes and in addition the changes taking place on the demand side when assessing the
tightness of the labour market. The higher the value of the index, the tighter the labour market is. However, it needs to be mentioned that the indicator created this
way can be a good measure of labour market tightness only if the changes in unemployment and vacancies are due to cyclical reasons. At the same time it is possible
that there are structural reasons behind the change. On the one hand the indicator could change while the tightness of the labour market remains the same. This is
the case when the steady state unemployment changes which in itself does not have any impact on the tightness by given amount of vacant positions. On the other
hand the unchanged indicator does not mean necessarily that the tightness of the labour market remained the same. This happens if the numerator and the
denominator changes with the same rate, and therefore it may be hypothesized that the structures of labour demand and supply differ. It is possible if there is skill
mismatch in certain segments of the labour market.
Chart 1-17
Developments in activity, employment and
unemployment
(Thousand persons; seasonally adjusted monthly data)
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Chart 1-18
Ratio of job vacancy and unemployment
(Seasonally adjusted monthly data)
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Contradictory data regarding private sector
employment
While employment decreased in the private sector according
to institutional statistical data, the labour force survey has
shown further increase in this sector. Because we consider the
latter one more consistent with actual economic
developments (e.g. national account statistics), we have
concentrated on this rather than institutional statistics in our
analyses.
In respect of the breakdown by sectors, in accordance with
the development of economic activity, a steady increase in
the number of employees has been observed in
manufacturing since the beginning of the year, which is
mainly typical in the sectors functioning as the engines of
industrial business activity. Although the earlier growth has
turned into stagnation, so far we cannot see any signs of a
definite adjustment in the number of employees in market
services, despite the deterioration in profits due to falling
domestic demand and the high wage dynamics compared to
productivity. It seems that the sector is trying to correct the
situation by moderating wage growth.
Examining this latter sector in more detail reveals that the
number of employed declined amongst small enterprises
employing less than 5 people, which are affected by cost
shocks the most.
In addition, adjustments in the number of employees may
also still take place at larger enterprises in the future, simply
with a longer delay compared to our earlier expectations.
The underlying explanation is that, presumably, in the short
run the costs of dismissal are considerably higher than the
wage adjustment realised through the payment of bonuses.
However, in the event of a permanent widening of the output
gap, the deterioration in profit can only be compensated
either through the regular component of pay rises or through
an adjustment in the number of employees.
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Chart 1-19
Skill mismatch in manufacturing
(Seasonally adjusted quarterly data)
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Chart 1-20
Number of employed in the private sector based on
institutional and LFS statistics
(Seasonally adjusted quarterly data)
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Chart 1-22
Number of self-employed in market services
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Chart 1-21
Employment in manufacturing and market services
(LFS statistics)
(Seasonally adjusted quarterly data)
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Nevertheless, it was not the services sector which suffered the
worst deterioration in profits, but rather the construction
industry, since the government measures aimed at tackling
the informal economy have affected this sector most.
Additionally, one result of the major curtailment of public
investment (mainly construction-type investment) and the fall
in households’ housing investment was that the unfavourable
domestic economic conditions had the greatest effect on this
sector on the revenue side as well. Accordingly, the largest
work force reductions also took place in this industry, and
thus the decline in construction employment explains most of
the decline in the number of employed, which can be seen in
the institutional workforce statistics.
14
Companies adjust through bonuses
On the whole, the wage data since the May Report have been
in line with our expectations. The annual wage indices of the
private sector
15
have steadily fluctuated within the 8-9 per
cent band in recent months, while month-on-month wage
growth declined from a value around 10 per cent early in the
year to the vicinity of 7.5 per cent by June. 
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Over the last one and half years, there were several events which
rendered it very difficult to assess the current wage developments
relevant in terms of economics. On the one hand, bonus payments in
the corporate sector deviated from previous years’ seasonality, and on
the other hand, the government’s measures aimed at reducing tax
evasion also influenced the developments in wages disclosed by the
CSO. We have discussed the correction of the bias caused by the efforts
to tackle the informal economy on several occasions.16 This box text
presents a detailed explanation of the methodology of filtering out the
distorting effect appearing due to the changed seasonality of bonus
payments and, in connection with this, the methodology of calculating
underlying wage developments.
First, companies brought forward a part of the payment of the second-
quarter bonuses in 2006 Q1 for the first time. Then in August 2006 –
presumably for tax optimisation reasons – bonuses were brought
forward again from September and to a smaller extent from October.
Finally, a similar phenomenon was observed between November and
December 2006 and 2007 H1. In order to gain a clear picture of
underlying wage developments relevant in terms of economics, it is
indispensable to eliminate these distorting effects.
The changed seasonality of bonus payments basically affected
consecutive months. According to the results of statistical and time
series techniques, the changed seasonality is a discrete, transitory
phenomenon rather than a long-term realignment. Therefore, we
treated the changed seasonality of bonus payments by redistributing
the total bonus payment of the period affected by the changed
seasonality across individual months in accordance with their historical
distribution. This is in conformity with the assumption that, in the
periods under review, developments in bonus payments were in line
with those in the previous years.
There are, however, several indicators calculated in different ways to
capture underlying developments in wages, and no unambiguous
hierarchy can be set up in terms of assessing the developments.
Consequently, in our assessment of the situation, a band made up of
these alternative indicators can illustrate the underlying developments
in wages the best.
The indicators applied can be arranged in groups along two
dimensions. On the one hand, in terms of how the bonus payments are
taken into account. In the first case, bonuses are not taken into account
at all (regular wages), while in the second case we assume that bonus
payments were whitened to the same extent as regular wages, and
finally, in the last method we assumed that whitening took place only
for regular wages. We believe that this latter assumption seems more
plausible, as the government measures which resulted in whitening
Box 1-2: A discussion of the trend indicator capturing fundamental processes in wages
Chart 1-23
Changed and redistributed seasonality of
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14 The remarkable decrease in employment can not be seen in the labour force statistics yet. Box 1-1 deals in detail with the real economy developments observed in
the construction sector.
15 Wage data excluding the ‘whitening’ effect and the distorting effect of the changed seasonality of bonus payments.
16 See e.g. Eppich–Lõrincz: Three methods to estimate the distortedness of wage statistics caused by ‘whitening’, MNB Occasional Papers 66.
It still seems that over the short run companies are trying to
adjust wages mainly by restraining bonus payments. This is
indicated by the fact that annual dynamics of bonuses lag
behind similar data on regular wages.
By 2007 Q2, considering the private sector as a whole, the
extent of the deterioration in profits declined in the
corporate sector as a whole. The adjustment was basically led
by the behaviour of the services sector, as there has been no
sign of a decline in profit in manufacturing, because real
wages have been in conformity with the improvement in
productivity.
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affected those wage categories more in which the share of bonus
payments is not significant. This hypothesis is also supported by the
statistical properties which can be derived from seasonal adjustment.
The second dimension of the breakdown differentiates according to
which sectors of the national economy we consider relevant in terms of
inflationary pressure: the private sector as a whole, or only the
aggregate generated from manufacturing and market services. We
attach special importance to the latter one because the remaining, low-
weight sectors are less affected by the general economic activity; they
are much more influenced by sector-specific shocks.
The annualized quarterly indices of the trend band calculated from
the six wage indicators produced have been fluctuating within the
7.0-8.0 per cent range recently. In terms of the quarter-on-quarter
dynamics of the trends, a gradual decline has been observed since the
end of 2006.
Chart 1-24
Trend band calculated from the wage indicators
capturing underlying developments in the
private sector
(Annualised quarterly changes)
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Chart 1-25
Developments in regular wages and bonuses in the
private sector 
(January-September average, annual change)
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Chart 1-26
Labour cost and productivity in the private sector*
(Seasonally adjusted quarterly data; annual changes)
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In 2007 Q3, the consumer price index was 7.7 per cent,
while core inflation amounted to 5.1 per cent.
17
Compared to
the previous quarter, the two indices declined by 0.9 and 0.7
per cent, respectively, due mainly to the omission of the
increase in regulated energy prices in August 2006 and the
September 2006 VAT rate increase from the base. In
October, however, both indices increased, essentially due to
the current increase in food prices.
Decline in core inflation comes to an end
Current developments are captured by short-based indices.
According to the index showing quarterly changes, core
inflation did not decline in the past quarter, but stagnated at
around 4 per cent. Moreover, based on month-on-month
changes, core inflation even increased to over 5 per cent in
the last two months.
One aspect deserving attention is that the monthly increase in
core inflation is basically related to one product group,
namely processed foods. In general, core inflation and
inflation of processed food prices, which constitutes a part of
the former, move together well. The underlying reason is
that, in respect of the product groups which affect core
inflation, the volatility of processed foods is the highest.
Since mid-2007, it has become clear that food prices in the
2007-2008 season may increase similarly to previous years,
or even to a greater extent. Overall, food prices increased by
26 per cent in Hungary in the last two years, including
increases of 2 per cent in the last three months each, and this
magnitude of monthly increase has not been experienced for
7 years. As the consumer price index declined in the past
quarter despite the increase in food prices, nearly one-third
of the total inflation is attributable to foods.
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1.3. Inflation developments
Chart 1-27
Consumer price index and core inflation
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Chart 1-28
Underlying inflation developments*
(Seasonally adjusted, annualised data)
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taxes and the effect of the medical visit fee.
Chart 1-29
Inflation trend and processed food inflation
(Seasonally adjusted data; annualised monthly changes)
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* Core inflation calculated by the MNB, excluding changes in indirect
taxes and the effect of the medical visit fee.
** Indicator excluding the effect of the change in the VAT rate.
17 The core inflation forecast published regularly in the Report can be compared to the core inflation calculated by the MNB, the value of which was 5.9 per cent in
2007 Q2.
The current increase in food prices is an international
phenomenon. As opposed to the period between 2004 and
mid-2006, food inflation during the last year exceeded the
consumer price index in the euro area as well. Moreover, the
monthly change in Euro Area processed food prices in August
was higher than at any time in the last decade.
The global increase in agricultural and food prices of past years
has triggered higher food price inflation in Hungary than in the
euro area or the average of the CEE region
18
. However, the
accuracy of this statement cannot be determined in respect of
the most recent price shock. First, although food prices overall
have been rising robustly in Hungary over recent months, there
are several other European countries where the pace of price
increases in September-October was even faster than in
Hungary. This implies that the effects of price shocks on
Hungarian inflation were not stronger, but they worked
through a little earlier than elsewhere.
The global increases in prices for agricultural and food
products are partly due to long-term permanent factors and
partly to temporary factors. Long-term supply-side factors
include the decline in the land area used for agriculture and
the increased probability of extreme harvest results (because
of climate change), while long-term demand-side factors are
mainly the dynamic growth in consumption in Asia. The
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18 One of the reasons may be that changes in the global demand/supply cause greater price fluctuations in a smaller market as a matter of course. Otherwise, it is
also a fact that price increases can only partly be attenuated by imports from abroad, as the level of Hungarian food prices is below the European average.
Chart 1-30
Food prices
(Seasonally adjusted level; excluding the effect of changes in VAT)
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Chart 1-32
Food and consumer price inflation in the Euro area
(Annual index)
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Chart 1-33
Processed food inflation in the Euro Area and in the
region 
(Seasonally adjusted; annualised monthly changes)
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Chart 1-31
Food inflation and its contribution to the consumer
price index 
(Seasonally adjusted data; excluding the effect of the change in VAT)
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above effects were temporarily amplified by this year’s
especially weak global supply.
19
In Hungary, the increase in agricultural producer prices in
mid-2007 first appeared in the consumer prices of seasonal
products (vegetables, fruits, potatoes). In addition to higher
prices of unprocessed products, the increase in prices of more
processed products also became significant in the August
price increases to a lesser degree and to a significant degree
in the September price increases, and it is possible that the
pass-through of increased fodder costs may also have played
a role in this.
20
On the whole, increases in prices for agricultural raw
materials have exceeded our earlier expectations.
21
This
development is responsible for the stronger rise in consumer
food prices, and not more rapid pass-through of price
increases for raw materials into consumer prices. This is
illustrated by the calculation, according to which in case of
the 2003-2004 and the current wheat price increase the price
of flour started to increase the same way in August and the
price of bread in September, and until October, then and now
as well, the raw material price increase caused the same
extent of price increase in case of the more processed
products.
Tradables inflation also plays a role in the fact that the
decline in core inflation came to a halt. According to the
annualised quarterly indices, tradables inflation continued to
grow in Q3, and was persistently higher than in the period
between mid-2004 and mid-2006. It is worth examining
these two statements separately as well. The increase in
inflation is attributable to consumer durables. At the same
time, despite an increase in the past quarter, the inflation of
consumer durables is not higher than what could generally
be observed in the last five years, if we exclude the price
increase of cars from the time series. As opposed to this, for
a year inflation of non-durable tradables, which did not
increase any more in the last quarter, has been higher than
in the previous two years. Consequently, the stickiness of
tradables inflation at a higher level than observed in previous
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Chart 1-34
Producer price of wheat and consumer prices of
flour, bread and rolls
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Flour Rolls Wheat (actual)
Wheat (August)*
Bread
* In our August forecast, the producer price of wheat was taken from a
different data base compared to the current one, thus the past data of the
two time series are also slightly different.
Price increase Price increase of selected products in
proportion to wheat price increase
2003 2007 2003 2007
Wheat 42.5 78.5 1.00 1.00
Flour 12.9 32.2 0.30 0.41
Bread 6.1 11.5 0.14 0.15
Rolls 5.7 8.9 0.13 0.11
Table 1-1
Price changes of selected products between June and October (per cent)
19 Unfavourable weather resulted in extremely low crops in the South East European region, which comprises Hungary as well. 
20 In terms of unprocessed foods, especially significant are the price increases of seasonal products as well as egg, poultry and flour, while in case of processed foods
the prices of bread, bakery products, pasta, milk and vegetable oil increased most. For the time being, the price increase of pork has not exceeded the seasonal
effect, but the increase in fodder prices and, partly stemming from this, the decline in profitability project a declining supply and increasing prices in this product
group as well.
21 However, the increase in domestic food prices may be slowed down already over the short run by European economic policy if it encourages the import of
possibly cheaper foreign products more than now. One of the examples for this is the licensing in October of the import of certain gene-modified corn products
to the EU, which immediately made corn prices decline in the European – and thus Hungarian – commodity exchanges.
years is attributable to the development of non-durable
tradables.
Furthermore, the usual factors (for example, the forint
exchange rate or imported inflation) do not completely
explain developments in tradables inflation. There may be
several explanations. On the one hand, it is possible that a
non-defined factor has simply resulted in higher indices for a
brief period, but that over the longer run tradables prices will
return to the earlier assumed path. But it is also conceivable
that the long-term equilibrium price path is at a higher level
than we previously assumed, and inflation in the latest period
has simply returned to this path, after the surprise disinflation
recorded in 2004 and 2005. One possible explanation for
this is that global firms set prices in a way so as to leave as
little room as possible for commodity arbitrage. As the
average Hungarian price level remains below the European
average, the above arguments justify a gradual convergence
of prices.
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Chart 1-35
Tradables inflation
(Seasonally adjusted annualised quarterly changes)
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Disregarding the effect of the changes in the VAT and the medical visit
fee, inflation of services prices has been fluctuating at around 6 per cent
for three years. It is somewhat surprising that the inflation of this
product group shows very little volatility in the aforementioned period,
considering that this sector was exposed to several shocks, both from
supply and demand sides. The question arises, whether this inflation
rate can be considered high, and if so, what can cause disinflation.
It is worth assessing the inflation rates of services in comparison with the
inflation rates of tradables. Assuming free market competition and a
stable exchange rate, the inflation of products of the industrial sector
may not be different from international inflation, while the rate of
increase in industrial wages is equal to that of labour productivity. In a
transition economy it can be considered natural that the increase in the
price of services is higher than that of tradables. This may be caused, inter
alia, by the difference between labour productivities of the services and
industrial sectors, which is greater than in developed countries. This
means that if the equalisation of wages within a country is assumed, the
higher unit labour cost increase in the services sector may – due to
limited international arbitrage – result in an increasingly high rate of
price increases. The difference between the labour productivities of the
two sectors may be caused by several factors. On the one hand, it may be
a result of the difference in technical development. On the other hand, in
transition economies, the capital stock increases faster in the industrial
sectors than the average rate of the domestic economy. 
In addition, in transition economies demand for services usually
increases faster than demand for tradables, which adds to services
inflation again. It is worthy of attention that in the first two cases, i.e. in
case of supply-side pressure, as a start, it is the higher wages and the
higher ratio of labour costs which cause higher inflation, while in the
third case, i.e. in case of demand-side pressure, the higher price increase
can result in higher wages.
In Hungary, the difference between services and tradables inflations has
been stuck around 6-7 per cent since 2000. In this period, the difference
Box 1-3: What can explain the persistently high inflation of services?
Chart 1-36
Tradables inflation and market services in
Hungary and their difference*
(Based on annual changes)
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Other items had a neutral effect on inflation
In 2007 Q3, vehicle fuel prices remained unchanged
compared to the previous quarter, although they declined by
5.7 per cent compared to the same period last year, which in
turn is a result of the high base.
On the whole, compared to the previous quarter, regulated
prices remained unchanged in 2007 Q3. In terms of the
composition of the changes in regulated prices, the 3.8 per
cent decline in the price of commuting to work or school and
the 0.9 per cent increase in house-rent can be considered as
significant quarter-on-quarter price changes. The underlying
reason for the change in the first item is that in September,
students’ fares were reset to the earlier level, which prevailed
before May. Consequently, compared to August, there was
an 11.4 per cent decline in the price of this item in September
2007.
The fall in inflation expectations has stalled
The indicator measuring inflation expectations of households
12 months ahead rose slightly again, after falling in the
previous two quarters. In addition, perceived inflation in the
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between the average unit labour costs of the two sectors was also 6 per
cent, i.e. in accordance with the theoretical correlations, it explains the
inflation differential between the two sectors well.22 Besides, with
regard to certain years it can also be demonstrated that the difference
between unit labour costs is attributable not only to the difference in
productivity, but also to the higher wage dynamics of the services
sector. In international comparison, the above two sectors’ inflation and
unit labour cost differentials can also be considered extremely
significant, which is a result of the high inflation of services and their
low productivity growth compared to transition economies.
In summary, a possible answer to the above questions is that although
the difference in unit labour costs explains the inflation differential
well over the longer term, its magnitude is still unusually great by
international standards and not typical when the inflation rate is low
over a longer period. Consequently, a decline in services inflation is
presumably necessary in order to attain price stability. On the one
hand, it can take place from the supply side: either with a decline in
the productivity of the industrial sector or an increase in the
productivity of the services sector, which presumably entails an
increase in the capital/labour ratio. While in the first case it is the
decline in the growth rate of wages that results in lower inflation, in
the second case a decline in wage growth is not necessary for a
moderation of inflation. On the other hand, a decline in services
inflation may also be enforced by a drop in demand, which, ceteris
paribus, may depress wages as well.
Chart 1-37
Inflation differential and unit labour cost growth
rate differential of selected European countries
United Kingdom
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Slovakia
Romania
Portugal
PolandThe 
Netherladns
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Latvia
Italy
Ireland
Hungary
Greece
Germany France
Finland
Euro area (13 countries)
Estonia
Denmark
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Belgium
Austria
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ULC
Inflation
Source: AMECO data base and own calculation. The sample period is
the average of the years between 2001 and 2006.
Chart 1-38
Manufacturing and services sector labour
productivity differences in selected European
countries
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22 In the last three years the unit labour cost differential increased to more than 7 per cent.
past 12 months also increased a little. Both indicators are
high by historical standards, being close to previous peak
levels. All this may be explained by rising food price inflation,
which probably has a more immediate impact on households’
inflation perception than changes in the prices of other
product groups.
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Chart 1-39
Households’ inflation expectations*
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2. Financial markets

The significant financial market uncertainty, which
developed as a result of the money market turbulence in July-
August, started to decline in September and October. The
temporary improvement in the investment environment was
mainly the consequence of the Fed’s larger-than-expected
rate cut in September and, to a lesser extent, the US
macroeconomic data, which moved market sentiment in a
favourable direction. Prices of most risky instruments
recouped their end-summer losses almost completely, and a
number of stock price indices reached historical peaks in
October.
From the beginning of November subprime mortgages
related investment banks’ losses and exposures came again to
the front. Financial market uncertainty increased
considerably due to the officially announced losses. The
prices of risky assets depreciated significantly, while credit
spreads widened to or above levels seen during the end-
summer money market turbulence.
While market participants continue to expect a deceleration
of the US economy, most of them believe that there will not
be a recession. However, prospects for US and global growth
are also less certain in light of the fact that a number of
investment banks and international economic institutions
have scaled back their growth projections regarding the US
economy considerably. In the latest month, expectations of
rate cuts by the US Federal Reserve partly counterbalance the
gloomy outlook, as markets expect the US central bank to
continue cutting the base rate due to the significant
uncertainties surrounding the macroeconomic outlook.
Nevertheless, the confidence/liquidity problems stemming
from the US sub-prime mortgage market events in the late
summer are still present in the global financial system. In
August and September, the large central banks (ECB, Fed)
significantly increased the liquidity of interbank markets
through extraordinary tenders, but interbank rates did not
return to the vicinity of key rates. Overall, the euro and
dollar interbank markets continue to be characterised by
considerable uncertainty.
Looking ahead, from the aspect of the developments in the
international financial environment, most of the risks point
in a negative direction. It is still unclear to what degree the
decline in the US real estate market will affect the real
economy in the USA. According to international economic
institutions analyses, the real estate market problems are
expected to become even worse (see details in Box 2-1).
Following the significant tightening at the end of the
summer, credit market conditions temporarily became
FINANCIAL MARKETS
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Chart 2-1
Maggie credit spreads
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ECB policy rate, 3-month interbank euro deposit and
discount treasury bill yields
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somewhat looser in the second half of September and in
October. Nevertheless, premia are still much higher than the
levels seen in past years, which may lead to slower economic
growth going forward. In addition, as a result of supply and
demand factors and geopolitical factors, oil prices have
reached historic highs, representing a negative risk for
growth and inflation prospects at the same time.
Developments in inflation in developed countries have been
favourable recently, but looking ahead, along with oil price
increases, the global increase in food prices may also fuel
inflation expectations, which, in turn, may reduce central
banks’ manoeuvre for forestalling the adverse effects from
the disruptions in financial markets.
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Chart 2-4
Fed’s interest rate target, 3-month dollar deposit
and discount treasury bill yields
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At the core of the global confidence crisis emanating from the US
mortgage market was the global spread of lending risks (via
securitisation) related to buoyant US mortgage lending, which was
fostered by the low US interest rate environment, ample liquidity, rising
real estate prices and increasingly loose lending standards. As a result of
deterioration in the quality of mortgage loans, the markets were forced
to reassess the prices of securitised holdings, thus causing considerable
losses to investors of various types. As the magnitude of these losses
and the scope of institutions suffering them was and is still not
completely known, a confidence crisis developed in the money markets,
which resulted in an increase in the interest rates and a shortage of
liquidity in the short-term interbank money markets.
The US mortgage market turbulence has not reached its end yet, and for
several reasons it is likely that the underlying market of securitisation,
i.e. the quality of mortgage loans, will continue to deteriorate.
According to initial indications, the deterioration in quality of the
mortgage loans issued in 2006 has not reached its potential maximum
yet as the peak is expected around the 25th-30th month following
issuance, and that time has not come yet. A further risk factor is that a
significant portion of US mortgage loans feature floating interest rates,
and within this category of loans, many have teaser interest rates until the
first repricing (reset). The reset peak will be in March and April 2008, which
may result in a further increase in defaults in payment as well as losses,
due to the increasing instalments because of higher interest rates.
The third risk is that many parties who invested in securitised loans have
large liquidity exposure: they finance their long-term assets by issuing
short-term securities. Since some of these short-term instruments have
not expired since August, a portion of the liquidity stresses and
potential losses has not yet surfaced. Based on the aforementioned
three factors, the difficulties are expected to last, which may generate
further losses for investors through non-transparent channels, adding
to the uncertainty.
The Hungarian banking sector is not directly exposed to the US
mortgage market. Consequently, the troubles experienced in European
and the US money markets in August have not influenced the
Hungarian market significantly over the short term. The cost of foreign
funding of domestic banks was affected by the 35-45 basis point
increase in the 1- and 3-month interbank euro interest rates observed
since early August, although its effect in terms of narrowing the
banking system margin was insignificant.
Box 2-1: The US mortgage market crisis and possible ramifications for financial stability
Chart 2-5
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Compared to earlier periods, the deterioration in the global
financial environment has affected emerging markets to a
lesser extent. Although the decline in the demand for risky
instruments at the end of the summer had an unfavourable
impact on these markets as well, the negative effect was
moderate and temporary. In October, for example, a number
of emerging market stock market indices and currency
exchange rates reached historic highs. There are several
factors underlying the relative stability of emerging markets.
First, the deterioration in the international investment
environment was triggered by a shock emanating from
developed markets (US sub-prime mortgage market), and
second, compared to earlier turbulent periods, emerging
economies are now characterised by a more favourable
fundamental situation. Looking ahead, according to market
opinions, if financial problems start from the developed
markets in the near future as well, the aforementioned
economies may be more resistant to negative shocks than
before.
Following the declines in August, by the beginning of
October, domestic instrument prices returned to the levels
preceding the sell-off. Similarly to other emerging markets,
the increase in investors’ risk appetite resulted in
appreciation of Hungarian investments as well. The
developments in various risk indices suggested that investors
increasingly differentiated between risky instruments
according to what extent they were directly exposed to the
problems of the US sub-prime mortgage market. Following
the significant jump at the end of the summer, premia on the
risk-free yields of prime US and European corporate loans
declined only slightly in October. As opposed to this, credit
default swap (CDS) spreads of certain emerging market
countries declined to the vicinity of the July level by October.
During the November financial market turbulence similar
investors’ behaviour could be observed. Corporate credit
spreads in developed markets increased above levels seen in
end-summer, while the increase in CDS spreads of emerging
markets was lesser.
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The owners of the Hungarian banking sector are mainly European and
US banks, which operate in markets exposed to the problems. The
protracted, prolonged, and perhaps deepening confidence crisis in
foreign interbank markets may unfavourably affect financial stability
through two channels over the longer term. We should like to
emphasise that the Hungarian banking sector and economy do not face
any considerable risks through these channels, and there are no signs
that these indirect effects materially affect financial stability.
The first channel is the increase in liquidity risks, which may partly have
an impact through an increase in the price of foreign funds and/or
through the rollover risk increasing due to the interbank markets, which
are suffering from a protracted period of insufficient liquidity.
In recent years, Hungarian banks have become increasingly compelled
to use foreign funds, as domestic savings have not been able to finance
the increase in lending to households. Most of the foreign funds are
received by Hungarian subsidiaries from their own parent banks, but
other foreign funds have also become increasingly involved. In the
banking system, around 70 per cent of the foreign currency funds and
the extended foreign currency loans are repriced within 3 months, and
80-90 per cent within 6 months. Therefore, the costs of funds, which are
becoming more expensive due to the increase in risk premia, pass
through the Hungarian banking sector relatively rapidly, and the
banking system is able to pass these costs on to their clients relatively
quickly. In the event that banks do so, due to the increasing instalments,
the quality of the portfolio may change for the worse, and if strong
competition forces banks not to include the increasing costs of funds in
the interest rates on loans or only partly, that may result in a narrowing
of banks’ margin and thus a deterioration in profitability. The increase in
the cost of funds affects domestic non-financial corporations
independently of the banking system as well, because nearly half of
their outstanding loans are originated directly from abroad, and the
increase in costs through this channel may impair the efficiency and
reduce the growth prospects of the sector.
Another consequence of the increase in liquidity risks may be the
increase in funding risk. A potential further increase in the confidence
crisis between parent banks may result in a prolonged liquidity
bottleneck on foreign interbank markets, making it more difficult to
rollover foreign funds. Rollover risks may be mitigated by the fact that a
significant part of foreign funds of the banking system originates from
the foreign owners, who will presumably prefer their Hungarian
subsidiaries when redistributing the smaller amount of available funds,
since they are extremely profitable.
The second channel may be the development of the ‘credit crunch’
situation evolving in the US and European markets. Based on empirical
evidence, this means that if banks face considerable losses, they reduce
their willingness to take risks, apply much tighter lending conditions, and
provide loans with higher risk premia. Consequently, the chance of a
slowdown in economic growth increases. The ‘credit crunch’ which might
develop in the US and European markets may affect domestic markets in
two ways. On the one hand, faltering growth in external markets may
deteriorate the performance of the Hungarian economy, and on the other
hand, this effect may be amplified by the fact that higher risk aversion
amongst parent banks and tighter lending conditions may reduce
domestic affiliates’ lending activity as well, resulting in the development
of a domestic ‘credit crunch’. These two effects together may have a
negative impact on the growth prospects of the Hungarian economy.
However, from the second part of October, domestic asset
prices stopped appreciating, while the appreciation of the
region and emerging markets continued. The exchange rate
of the forint fluctuated within a narrow trading band against
the euro in mid-October, while in November it depreciated
slightly due to the financial market uncertainty. In the past
one and half months, the forint exchange rate depreciated
against the Czech koruna, the Slovak koruna and the Polish
zloty.
The central bank’s interest rate decisions did not bring any
surprise for the markets; after the publication of the August
Report the central bank base rate declined by 25 basis points to
7.5 per cent. Short-term interest rate cut expectations have
remained relatively stable in the past months, although in the
last 3 months the central bank base rate was cut by 25 basis
points, as opposed to the 50 basis points expected for a 3-
month period when the August Report was published.
According to market participants’ expectations, the interest
rate cut cycle will continue in the coming period as well, and
over a 3-month time horizon they still expect a 25-50 basis
point monetary loosening. At the same time, interest rate cut
expectations until the end of 2008 strengthened considerably
in mid-September, which may be attributable to the Fed’s mid-
September interest rate cut, which exceeded market
expectations. In these days the increase in investors’ willingness
to take risks resulted in a decline in yields with a maturity over
1 year. In contrast, rate expectations in November moderated,
possibly due to the above consensus October inflation data and
international investor’s worthening sentiment. Currently, the
yield curve indicates a 6.75 per cent central bank base rate for
end-2008, which means a total 75 basis point interest rate cut
for the coming more than one year.
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Chart 2-6
10-year CDS in selected emerging market countries
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Forint/euro exchange rates
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Chart 2-8
MNB policy rate and policy rate expectations for the
end of 2007 and 2008
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Overall, in terms of the nominal exchange rate the stance of
monetary policy has not changed significantly since the
August Report. The real exchange rate appreciated, mainly as
a result of the re-strengthening of the forint exchange rate to
levels around EUR/HUF 250 and to a lesser extent due to the
inflation differential. Market participants expect the forint
exchange rate to stabilise at EUR/HUF 250, both over the
short and medium term.
Since August, the level of the 1-year real interest rate has
been fluctuating around 3 per cent, which is typical of recent
years. Following the announcement of last year’s fiscal
adjustment, the forward-looking 1-year real interest rate
declined to around 1 per cent by the middle of the year, as a
result of an increase in inflation expectations. Starting from
the second half of last year, however, the moderation of
inflation expectations exceeded the decline in yields, and
thus the real interest rate increased again to nearly 3 per cent.
Although the decline in inflation expectations came to a halt
after August, which, together with a slight decline in the 1-
year yields, resulted in a minimum decline in the forward-
looking real interest rate, the approximately 3 per cent level
continues to be close to the average real interest rate typical
of recent years.
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3. Outlook for inflation 
and the real economy

The long-term economic interactions underlying the forecasts
in the previous Reports have not changed substantially in the
past quarters, but the short-term outlook has become less
favourable.
23
As the one-off inflation and growth impact of the
government measures in 2006 are wearing off, the economy
is slowly and gradually approaching the long-term
equilibrium path. In this context, sustainability indicators are
improving, inflation will continue to drop and economic
growth is expected to gain momentum in the years ahead
after hitting a low point this year.
Looking ahead, the negative output gap is a major
contributor to the reduction in the rate of inflation. This
impact will partly materialize through demand dropping
below potential levels, and also pointing toward more
disciplined wage dynamics in the labour market.
Last year, the Hungarian economy was hit by a series of cost
shocks with the capacity to destabilise the long-term outlook
for inflation. According to our assessment, higher inflation
expectations could represent the most important risk factor
around the baseline scenario, due especially to the high
inflation history of the Hungarian economy. In recent
months this particular type of risk grew even further, as
another major wave of price shocks hit, in the form of steep
rises in prices of agricultural products, which will lead to
additional inflationary impacts in the months to come.
In light of the above, we expect improvement from the
starting point of low growth and high inflation, but it will
probably take longer than previously expected, particularly
as far as inflation is concerned. Consequently, average
inflation next year will exceed the inflation target
significantly, but is then expected to settle in around the
inflation target in 2009. At the same time, the risks pointing
toward higher inflation are now even more significant over
the entire forecast horizon.
Negative output gap until the end of 2009
As for the path of the real economy projected until 2009, in
recent months our views have shifted towards somewhat
lower growth. The impact of the fiscal adjustment measures
adopted by the government last year, which resulted in a
contraction of demand, is expected to become less important
in terms of economic developments, but the recovery
following this year’s slump will not be too spectacular. The
growth rate of the economy may be around 2.4 per cent next
year, and even in 2009 is expected to only marginally rise
past the 3 per cent level.
During periods of declining domestic demand, exports are
the major source of economic growth. In the wake of strong
external demand, exports are likely to maintain strong
growth rates over our forecast horizon (over 10 per cent), but
growth is then projected to gradually loose pace until 2009
relative to the 15 per cent rate forecasted for this year. In our
forecast, we have already incorporated the less dynamic
outlook for global growth due to the financial turbulence of
the summer of 2007. Based on the latest international
forecasts, we believe that the negative waves originating from
the US mortgage markets will have a lesser impact on
European growth, which plays a key role for Hungarian
exports, and thus will not have a major impact on the export
prospects of the Hungarian economy. Nevertheless, in the
analysis of risks surrounding the baseline scenario we
considered the impact of the sharp global slowdown to be
highly relevant.
Due to the growth in real household incomes projected for
the period after 2008, we expect to see gradual growth in
consumption over the next two years. Our forecast – as
before – is characterised by consumption smoothing. As the
rate of consumption is expected to decline less than incomes
this year, in the same way, it is envisaged to rise below the
rate of increase in incomes until 2009. In analysing the
behaviour of households, it should be kept in mind that
consumption smoothing applies only to consumption
expenditures; in the case of transfers in kind comprising
almost one quarter of all consumption, such as healthcare
benefits, public education and price subsidies, the
government’s reform measures have a major influence on
dynamics. Next year transfers in kind are expected to decline
by 2 per cent, far less than this year’s drop of 8 per cent, and
slight growth is expected for 2009.
The outlook for investment prospects differs considerably
among the various sectors (corporate, household and
government). Investment by export-oriented companies is
likely to remain relatively strong, but the remarkably high
growth rate seen during the first half – resulting mainly from
individual effects – is not expected to prevail. Investments in
3.1. The baseline scenario
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23 The projections are based on information available up to the 16th of November, c.o.b.
the manufacturing industry are supported by strong external
demand, and also by the high rate of capacity utilisation. On
the other hand, the future outlook on external economic
activities shows a less favourable picture, thus export-oriented
companies are also expected to expand investments at a slower
rate than previously expected. The higher corporate interest
rate spreads, due to increased uncertainty on financial market,
may lead to an increase in user cost of firms, which also points
towards less buoyant investment. Furthermore, the general
factors of uncertainty surrounding the business environment
continue to have a negative influence on the investment
climate throughout the entire corporate sector, as shown by
business confidence surveys (see Chapter 1.1). Moreover, the
service sector is facing particularly weak domestic demand, and
since income expectations of households are slow to improve,
we do not expect a substantial increase in the household sector
before 2009. As regards quasi-fiscal investment activities
(public services, infrastructure, etc.), the increasing volume of
EU funds support the expansion of investment dynamics, but
there is a great degree of uncertainty in terms of size. At the
same time, the impact of EU transfers on overall investments
across the entire spectrum is reduced by the fact that some of
these funds are appropriated for projects that would be
completed nonetheless.
24
In the narrow public sector (public
administration, local authorities), investment growth is
expected to remain low; in other words, the extra EU funds
will be used in all likelihood to replace budgetary funds to
some extent. Consequently, as far as the whole economy is
concerned, we expect to see a moderate, but gradual increase
in gross fixed capital formation.
As a result of the gradually strengthening growth in domestic
demand and the mild slowdown in external growth, the
contribution of net exports to growth is expected to decline.
In 2009, domestic factors are expected to take over and play
a dominant role as far as growth is concerned. Regarding
2009, however, it is important to note that we do not see any
indications supporting a growth rate around 4 per cent, the
average of last years, in the light of the dynamics of major
growth factors, such as investments, labour force reserves and
technological development.
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Chart 3-1
GDP growth rate and contributions
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The majority of economic models capture inflationary effects of the
demand side through the output gap. With demand falling back and
the economy growing below its potential rate (i.e. with the output gap
turning negative), a degree of slack – unemployment and underutilised
capital – emerges in the economy, which looking forward acts as a
brake on price and wage increases as long as factor utilisation reaches
normal levels. Lower input costs help the economy to return to
equilibrium, i.e. output to rise back to its potential growth rate,
facilitating price cuts or a slower pace of price rises. Therefore the rising
demand leads to higher output. 
However, putting this theoretical relationship into practice gives rise to
considerable uncertainties. A major difficulty is in measuring the
potential output growth rate. There exist two different ways to deal with
the problem. One solution is to use statistical time series techniques.
Under this approach, the long-term trend is taken as the potential
growth rate, and any deviations from trend will produce a measure of
the output gap. It should be noted, however, that estimating the longer-
term trend is very sensitive to observations at the end of the sample, i.e.
the current low rate of output growth may also reduce the trend.
Another method is to derive a production function-based measure of
the potential growth rate using economic variables and factors of
production. In practice, it is often the case that the most relevant
individual component, the consumption gap, is chosen as a starting
point, rather than overall GDP, in explaining domestic inflation
developments.
Due to the uncertainties surrounding the estimates, staff use a number of
approaches in producing their inflation projection. In the simultaneous
macroeconomic model (NEM) the starting point has been staff’s earlier
Box 3-1: Different estimates of output and consumption gaps
24 This is supported by some of the international experience related to the appropriation of EU funds provided for investments, as addressed in Chapter 3 of the
MNB’s Report on Convergence (December 2006).
As far as short-term prospects are concerned, the turning
point of the cycle is expected to come in the second half of
2007 and, according to our forecast, short-base indices will
indicate an upturn from the third and fourth quarters. The
preliminary third quarter GDP figures and the latest retail
sales figures also indicate an upcoming turning point in
economic activity, in particular among durable consumer
goods. However, the level of uncertainty that surrounds this
turning point is high, due to the massive inventories shown in
the relevant statistics which indicate that demand is below the
expectations of producers. In our assessment this can have a
disinflationary effect if the weak sales expectations
materialize.
Prolonged wage adjustments in response to higher
inflation in 2008
In recent quarters, our forecasts have placed a great deal of
emphasis on the analyses of labour market developments, as
we viewed the adjustment of the labour market to the shocks
of 2006 to be a key issue. Similar to our previous forecasts,
we still believe that substantial wage adjustments are likely to
occur during the period 2008-2009, and by the end of the
forecast period wage dynamics will be in line with the
inflation path, approaching price stability. In the process of
formulating our main scenario we did not incorporate co-
ordination problems on the labour market, and the risks
stemming from expectations are reflected in our risk
assessment.
The starting point for our wage projection is that the high
wage indices seen in the last year in the private sector are
attributed to efforts to combat the informal economy only to
a certain extent, as ‘true’ wage growth, bearing relevance
from the perspective of economic developments, is also
excessive. All of this, combined with moderate price
increases, led to lower rates of profitability in the aggregate
corporate sector. The loss in profits affected the various
sectors differently; therefore, looking ahead it will lead to
different adjustments paths as well.
In the manufacturing industry, relying on the buoyant
external economic activities we expect to see rapid growth in
productivity in the years to come. In line with the mild
external slow down, nominal wage growth will also subside,
meaning that unit labour costs will not be higher in our
forecast horizon. According to our calculations, the profit
ratio of corporations did not dwindle last year in the
manufacturing industry, and looking forward we expect to
see stable profit earned on labour. As for market services, we
expect higher unit labour costs in the light of slower growth
in productivity, however, at a gradually slowing pace as in the
case of nominal wages starting in the second half of 2007,
with wage growth dropping below 7 per cent by 2009. The
reason for this is that we expect to see moderate changes in
prices of market services in response to sluggish demand, and
the onset of adjustments in the profit rates will emerge as a
disciplinary force as well. By 2009 the rate of profit in the
sector is not expected – in spite of the projected increase – to
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estimate for the potential growth rate of between 3.5-4 per cent, taking
into account past growth in factors of production and technological
progress. This implies a negative output gap over the entire forecast
period. However, the more recent estimates, derived on the basis of the
adverse developments of the past few years (e.g. subdued investment
spending and a slowdown in technological progress), suggest that the
potential growth rate of the Hungarian economy may have slowed to
around 3 per cent. If this is the case, the output gap opens up less than in
the case of higher growth. In staff’s partial forecasting framework, the
longer-term trend is estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, but the
consumption gap is used instead of the output gap. The forecast
prepared using this method is for the consumption gap to close
gradually, with little if any disinflationary effect in 2009. 
To summarise, in the current macroeconomic environment quantifying
the output gap and its disinflationary effects is a key forecast issue.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable uncertainty surrounding the
estimates. Due to this uncertainty, therefore, it is important that these
factors are reflected in the risk assessment.
Chart 3-2
Estimates for the output and consumption gaps
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reach the level seen during the years characterized by strong
domestic demand.
As for the private sector as a whole, adjustments in the labour
market will have to exceed the level prompted by the two
most important sectors, namely the manufacturing industry
and market services. The reason for this is that in the sectors
with smaller weight (construction and agricultural
industries), which are also showing signs of greater
depression, the rate of profit could drop even further in the
light of weak production outlook. Hence, these sectors will
be exposed to even greater pressure for price, wage and
labour force adjustments.
In light of the above, on the whole we continue to expect that
in 2009 wage growth will drop below 7 per cent in the
private sector, however, due to the higher inflation path
projected for next year, the adjustment of wages could take
longer than previously assumed,
25
and thus the growth rate of
wages may diminish considerably only in 2009.
As far as the other channel of labour market adjustments, the
workforce, is concerned, in our opinion the rate of
employment in the private sector will diminish slightly. The
massive lay-offs in the smaller sectors might constitute the
driving force of the downward trend.
Higher inflation in the short run, followed by a
decline close to target in 2009
Based on unchanged average monetary conditions of
October, and our further assumptions, inflation in 2009
could drop to the level of the medium-term objective. The
rate of decline in inflation, however, might be slower than
previously expected, which means that next year’s inflation
may be significantly above the target, at around 5 per cent.
Our view has not changed in respect of the key economic
relationships driving inflation. Weak domestic demand and a
negative output gap point towards lower inflation over the
entire forecast horizon. Due to the labour market
adjustments discussed above, we do not foresee any major
price pressure, in spite of the fact that nominal wages may
increase at a rate higher than previous expected.
Apart from economic relationships, there are numerous
individual factors influencing inflation substantially. During
the autumn months, the impact of the government’s measures
affecting prices moved out of the annual price indices,
allowing the rate of inflation to drop by 2.5 percentage
points. The new shock that has emerged in recent months,
namely the sharp global increase in agricultural prices, will
however mitigate the decline in inflation in the short run. At
our forecast horizon, one of the most important questions
from the perspective of the inflation outlook is the effect the
recent shock of food prices will have on the overall prices
over the longer run. In other words, it is important to
determine the part of recent price increases that is likely to
persist, and the part that is deemed temporary.
Relative to other components of the consumption basket, the
volatility of food prices is extremely high; thus, longer-term
forecasts necessarily involve a greater degree of uncertainty.
Despite the existing uncertainty, we now believe that the
lasting component of the price increase may be greater than
envisaged in our previous quarterly forecast. On the one hand,
the future prices of crops on the commodities market rose
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Chart 3-3
Private sector unit labour cost components
(Quarterly data; annual rate of change)
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Chart 3-4
Changes in workforce in the private sector
(LFS statistics; quarterly data, seasonally adjusted)
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25 The survey of Hewitt consultants also support an increase in wage prognosis, showing that companies plan to increase wages at a rate similar to what we have
seen in 2007. Furthermore, our updated model simulations on wage development also indicate that the adjustments of wages will be slower than expected
earlier. 
considerably during the autumn, and on the other hand, due to
the growing popularity of bio fuels and to the growing volume
of food imports of emerging markets, the leading forecasting
institutions prognosticate a long-term path of massive price
increases, despite adjustments in supply. Nevertheless, similar
to our August forecast we still believe that the price level of
unprocessed foods will decline in the second half of 2008. As
a result food prices might be a major factor behind the
declining inflation in the second half of 2008.
Apart from food prices, energy prices will also exert
pressure on prices longer than previously expected, due
mostly to increases in the price of electricity. The price of
electricity supplied to households, that appears directly in
the consumer price index, is a regulated price, while
production costs will be influenced by the increasing price
of electricity supplied to the corporate sector on the
liberalized market. The latter may be felt indirectly in the
consumer price index as well.
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Weight 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Unprocessed food 5.6 16.1 9.3 12.3 18.8 13.9 8.6 2.3 -3.5 -0.5 3.8 4.1 3.8
Fuel and market enegry 6.7 2.3 0.6 -2.1 6.5 9.1 2.5 0.5 -2.1 -2.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0
Regulated prices 21.5 15.3 17.6 15.6 10.1 7.1 6.7 6.5 6.1 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.9
Core inflation 66.2 6.4 6.7 5.9 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.9
CPI 100.0 8.5 8.6 7.7 6.9 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9
Yearly average
Core inflation 6.0 4.6 3.1
CPI 7.9 5.0 3.0
Table 3-1
Inflation forecast main scenario
Higher forecast due to the continued increase of the prices of
agricultural products and electricity and slower wage adjustment
Consistent with our forecasting practice, we have prepared
conditional forecasts. Included among our main assumptions are fixed
levels of foreign exchange rates (EUR/HUF, EUR/USD), the base rate
and long-term yields, in addition to the October average forward oil
price path. The average EUR/HUF exchange rate in October was
approximately 2 per cent weaker than the July average used in the
previous quarter. The climb in spot oil prices in dollars is offset to a
large extent by the dollar’s decline against the euro, and by the decline
in the forward oil price path. On the whole, these basic assumptions
show an upward trend, but did not justify any major changes from the
August forecast.26
Box 3-2: Changes in our forecast relative to the August Report
Table 3-2
Changes in major assumptions relative to the August Report*
August 2007 Current
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.5 7.5 7.5
EUR/HUF exchange rate 248.6 246.8 246.8 250.8 250.8 250.8
EUR/USD exchange rate (US cents) 135.0 137.2 137.2 1.36 1.42 1.42
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 69.6 75.0 73.8 71.0 80.2 77.0
Brent oil prices (HUF/barrel) 12 793 13 491 13 285 13 018 14 135 13 566 
* Annual averages, based on the monthly average exchange rate in August 2007 and the crude oil futures price.
** End-of-year values.
26 The effect of the massive oil price increase in the second half of October is better reflected if only the data of the last 10 working days is used. In this case average
2008 inflation would be 0.3 per cent higher and 2009 by 0.2 per cent.
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In terms of regulated prices during the last quarter specific information
regarding public transport, water and sewerage fees are worth
mentioning. These effects together will increase inflation by 0.1 per cent
in 2008. In the absence of specific information we continue to provide
rule-based forecasts for other sub-categories, based on core inflation.
We have updated this latter rule consistent with the developments in
recent years, as a result of which we have increased our forecast for
regulated prices, but the inflationary impact of this change remains
below 0.1 per cent.
As indicated in the previous subchapter, the higher inflation path is
attributed to a large extent to the stronger-than-expected rise in food
prices, and higher unit labour costs and electricity price also need to be
mentioned. In August, we postulated that the agricultural price shock in
2008 will result in an increase of close to 1 percentage point of overall
price level of the consumption basket, then in 2009 the overall price
level could drop by 0.3 per cent. Based on the latest information, we
consider the shock to be greater, and any consequent reduction in the
price level may be smaller, thus leading to a smaller disinflationary
impact.
Regarding the effects of labour market processes, it is worth noting that
our forecast of unit labour costs for 2007 is somewhat higher than
previously expected as sizeable work force adjustment has not
materialized this year. Meanwhile, the higher 2008 inflation might
suggest a slightly slower wage adjustment, compared to our former
expectation.
According to the latest information, in the deregulated electricity
market prices are expected to rise starting January 2008, and this will
have a direct effect on production costs in the corporate sector. In this
sector we anticipate higher price increases than in our August forecast,
both for 2008 and 2009. The additional inflationary impact will be
around 0.2 per cent annually.
Chart 3-5
Changes in the forecast for agricultural
producers’ prices 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual Projection
August Current August Current August Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.4 5.9 6.0 4.3 4.6 2.7 3.1
Consumer price index 3.9 7.6 7.9 4.5 5.0 2.4 3.0
Economic growth*
External demand (GDP-based) 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.9 3.2 2.9
Fiscal impact on demand2 2.6 x -3.6 x –0.8 x -0.1
Household consumption 1.9 -0.9 -2.1 0.2 0.4 1.6 1.6
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 1.4 x -0.3 x 0.9 x 1.8
Fixed capital formation -2.1 1.8 1.7 4.5 4.2 5.8 5.5
Domestic absorption ** 0.4 -0.2 0.0 1.1 1.2 3.0 3.0
Export 17.9 14.7 15.1 12.4 11.6 11.3 10.3
Import3,** 12.4 11.9 13.1 10.6 10.3 11.0 10.2
GDP 3.9 2.0 1.6 2.7 2.4 3.4 3.2
Current account deficit 3,**
As a percentage of GDP 6.5 x 5.5 x 5.3 x 5.2
EUR billions 5.8 x 5.7 x 5.9 x 6.1
External financing requirement 3.**
As a percentage of GDP 5.7 x 4.3 x 3.3 x 2.8
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.2 x 8.4 x 6.5 x 5.4
Whole-economy employment5 0.7 x 0.4 x -0.1 x -0.2
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.4 x 9.7 x 7.7 x 6.8
Private sector employment5 0.9 x 1.1 x 0.0 x -0.3
Private sector unit labour cost5,7 4.7 x 7.0 x 4.4 x 3.0
Household real income -1.5*** x -3.0 x 2.1 x 2.4
Table 3-3
Changes in the forecast relative to August 2007
1
For technical reasons, the indicator that we project may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it
follows a similar trend. 
2
Calculated from the augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As a result of
uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 actual import figure and current account deficit/external financing requirement
may be higher than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO labour
force statistics, however, due to the change of the method the data is not directly comparable with the previous published one. 
6
Data including the effect
of whitening, consistent with headline CSO data. 
7
Private sector unit labor cost calculated with wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and
changed seasonality of bonuses.
* Our analyses and forecasts are based on the quarterly data of the GDP flash report published by the CSO on 7 September. In the summary table we
have indicated changes in volume during the period in question relying on the same publication. Let us point out, however, that the figures contained
in the CSO publication entitled ‘Gross Domestic Product 2006 (second estimation)’ since published deviates from the numbers shown in this table as
regards certain partial aggregates. For the latter, however, we do not have quarterly data to use for our prognosis.
** Our projection for 2007 includes the impact of the Hungarian Army’s Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and increases
community consumption and imports.
*** An MNB estimate.
The baseline scenario in the inflation forecast represents the
outcome that we deem most probable. Naturally, there are
numerous other alternatives as far as the scenario is
concerned: the five alternatives we believe to be the most
important is summarized in the risk distribution. We use fan
charts to illustrate the baseline scenario of inflation and
growth, and the risks surrounding them.
From the perspective of inflation, the largest degree of
uncertainty lies in the fact that the one-off hike in prices
could lead to persistently higher inflation expectations. If
employees lose faith and no longer expect that inflation will
return to the level consistent with price stability, or at least
close to it, they will demand higher wages to compensate for
the higher inflation. In this case, the nominal wage path may
depart from productivity growth, that could ultimately force
companies to higher price increases. Having regard to the
sequence of supply and cost shocks, and also to their sizes,
recently the second-round impacts are considered to be the
greatest inflation risks, which could shift the 2009 path
upward significantly.
Similarly, trends in the profit situation of the corporate sector
also involves risks pointing towards higher inflation. In our
baseline scenario, we predict that the loss of profits seen
recently will stop, but the previous profit levels cannot be
restored over this forecast horizon due to weakening
demand. In our alternative scenario, we project that
adjustments to restore profits will be implemented faster and
more intensely, meaning massive lay-offs and steeper price
increases. In our view, this path leads to lower employment
and output and to higher inflation, and represents a realistic
risk primarily in 2009.
As we have indicated in relation to our previous forecasts,
the impacts of fiscal tightening measures are surrounded by
a great deal of uncertainty. On the one hand, it is difficult
to predict the disciplinary effect that lower demand is
likely to have on pricing setting in the corporate sector. In
the light of our forecasting methods, we see some potential
that the disinflationary impact of the aforementioned
slowdown will be greater than what we have expected. On
the other hand, there are certain signs indicating that the
sagging GDP path is attributable to some extent to lasting
supply side factors. This is also supported by the fact that
there are no signs, for the time being, pointing towards a
cyclical decline in employment nor in terms of capacity
utilization. The lower dynamics of potential output has the
tendency to reduce disinflationary impact. In our opinion,
therefore, the inflationary impacts of a slower growth path
are now surrounded by symmetrical risks, which, on the
other hand, increases the uncertainty factor around our
forecast.
Of the uncertainty factors related to economic growth,
external demand appears to be the most significant. The crisis
in the US mortgage markets this summer exacerbated existing
worries relating to medium-term growth plans of markets in
Europe and overseas. It appears to be a realistic alternative
scenario that the devalued assets due to risk repricing are
likely to bring about lower global demand through the wealth
effect. This could cause direct setbacks in Hungarian net
exports and, via slower growth in global energy prices and
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3.2. Risks around the main scenario
Chart 3-6
Inflation baseline scenario and risk paths
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Chart 3-7
Baseline scenario of growth and risk paths
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lower international inflationary environment it could
indirectly have a slowing effect on inflation in Hungary.
Presently, we look upon this risk path as the most relevant
from the perspective of growth prospects, and in our view it
could lead to a level below the GDP baseline scenario in
2009.
The risks illustrated are practically symmetrical in 2008 on
the whole, as far as inflation and growth are concerned. In
2009, due mostly to higher expectations, in our opinion
there are considerable upside risks to inflation, while
economic growth is likely to drop if external demand fails to
reach the level predicted in our baseline scenario.
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Chart 3-8
Inflation forecast fan chart*
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* The fan chart represents the uncertainty around the central projection.
Overall, the coloured area represents a 90 per cent probability. The
central, darkest area containing the central projection for the consumer
price index illustrated by the white dotted line (as the mode of
distribution) refers to 30 per cent of the probability. The continuous,
horizontal line from 2007 shows the value of the announced inflation
targets.
Chart 3-9
GDP fan chart*
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
2
0
7
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
4
0
8
 Q
1
0
8
 Q
2
0
8
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
4
0
9
 Q
1
0
9
 Q
2
0
9
 Q
3
0
9
 Q
4
Per cent
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Per cent
* The fan chart represents the uncertainty around the central projection.
Overall, the coloured area represents a 90 per cent probability. The
central, darkest area containing the central projection for GDP
illustrated by the white dotted line (as the mode of distribution) refers to
30 per cent of the probability.
Effects of an alternative interest and exchange rate
path
We examined the impact on our forecast if we were to use
the last Reuters Poll from October and rely on the exchange
rate and interest rate expectations it contains. Compared to
the projections in the baseline forecast, the analysts do not
project a significantly different path for the exchange rate,
while in the case of central bank base rate they predict a cut
of 100 basis point by the end of 2008. Applying these
presumptions on our forecast, there are no significant
changes neither our inflation forecast, nor in our growth
forecast.
Our forecast compared to other forecasts
Comparing our forecast to the prognosis of other analysts
brings the following conclusions. The inflation prognosis for
2007 and 2008 is somewhat higher than the common market
expectation.
On the other hand, as far as the rate of economic growth is
concerned, the MNB’s position for both years is slightly more
pessimistic compared to the market. As regards the current
account deficit, (in absolute figures), the Magyar Nemzeti
Bank – similarly to the new IMF prognosis – anticipates that
the deficit will be somewhat higher than the average
indicated in the forecasts of market analysts, while in the case
of general government deficit its projection is about the
average.
As for our forecasts about the size of Hungary’s export
markets and the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trade
partners, we have made downward corrections relative to
August 2007, similar to international institutions, but our
forecast is practically the same as that of the others.
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3.3. Background information for the forecast
Chart 3-10
Exchange rate assumptions based on Reuters survey
prepared in November and fixed rate projection*
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Chart 3-11
Central bank base rate assumptions based on
Reuters survey prepared in November and the fixed
rate projection
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The MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections.
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’ responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated for the Reuters and
Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate distribution. 
2
Values calculated by MNB; the projections of the named institutions regarding
individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating the MNB’s own external demand indicators. This way, the forecast may differ
from the numbers published by the aforesaid institutions. 
3
The MNB prepares a forecast for the ESA deficit concurrently with the full Report. 
4
Our
projection takes account of the negative effect on the current account resulting from Gripen purchase. 
5
The OECD did not publish any information
about Romania, therefore Romania is not included in our OECD forecast. 
6
Since August 2007 the methodology used was revised, we have included the
forecasts of Hungary’s trade with Romania as well. 
Sources: Consensus Economics Inc. (London) (October 2007); Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (October 2007); European Commission Economic
Forecasts, Autumn 2007; IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2007); Reuters survey (October 2007); OECD Economic Outlook (May 2007).
2007 2008
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2007) 7.9 5.0
Consensus Economics (October 2007)1 7.4 - 7.7 - 7.8 3.3 - 4.4 - 5.6
OECD (May 2007) 7.2 3.7
European Commission (Autumn 2007) 7.7 4.9
IMF (October 2007) 7.6 4.5
Reuters-survey (October 2007)1 7.6 -7.8 -7.9 4.0 - 4.6 - 5.0
GDP (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (November 2007) 1.6 2.4
Consensus Economics (October 2007)1 1.5 - 2.1 - 2.6 2.2 - 3.0 - 3.5
OECD (May 2007) 2.5 3.1
European Commission (Autumn 2007) 2.0 2.6
IMF (October 2007) 2.1 2.7
Reuters-survey (October 2007)1 1.4 - 2.0 - 2.4 2.2 - 3.0 - 3.8
Current account deficit (billion EUR/USD)
MNB (November 2007) (EUR) 5.74 5.9
Consensus Economics (October 2007)1 (USD) 4.5 - 6.0 - 7.0 4.2 - 5.9 - 7.8
Reuters-survey (October 2007)1 (EUR) 4.4 - 5.0 - 5.3 3.6 - 4.7 - 5.2
Current account deficit (percent of GDP)
MNB (November 2007) 5.54 5.3
OECD (May 2007) 3.6 2.2
European Commission (Autumn 2007) 4.4 3.4
IMF (October 2007) 5.6 5.1
Budget deficit (ESA-95 method, per cent of GDP)
MNB (November 2007)3 6.1 4.0
Consensus Economics (October 2007)1 6.0 - 6.2 - 6.5 3.9 - 4.3 - 5.1
OECD (May 2007) 6.7 4.8
European Commission (Autumn 2007) 6.4 4.2
Reuters-survey (October 2007)1 5.8 - 6.1 - 6.6 3.7 - 4.2 - 4.9
Forecasts on the size of Hungary’s export markets
MNB (November 2007) 8.0 7.1
OECD (May 2007)2,5 7.2 7.5
European Commission (Autumn 2007)2,6 8.1 7.8
IMF (October 2007)2,6 6.9 7.6
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trade partners
MNB (November 2007) 3.4 2.9
OECD (May 2007)2,5 3.5 2.9
European Commission (Autumn 2007)2,6 3.6 3.1
IMF (October 2007)2,5 3.6 3.1
Table 3-4
Comparing the MNB baseline forecast to other forecasts

4. Fiscal and external balance

According to our forecast, the accrual-based budget deficit
(ESA deficit) may be lower in 2007 and 2008 than the deficit
target set forth in Hungary’s Convergence Programme, but
the pace of fiscal adjustment is expected to falter in 2009,
and there is a risk of failure to meet the deficit target.
According to our baseline forecast and the asymmetric
distribution of risks with a bias towards a higher deficit,
additional measures are required in order to meet the target
for 2009.
According to our baseline forecast, the fiscal path differs
in terms of dynamics from the path laid out in the
Convergence Programme. The reason for this is that
during the initial phase of the programme, the deficit
dropped at a pace faster than projected in the programme
due to better-than-expected revenues, while at the same
time, as far as expenditures are concerned, it is apparent
that government expenditures are catching up with higher
revenues. In other words, the extra revenue is partly spent
in this year, and it will be mostly spend in the next year
(for example, the wage freeze implemented in the public
sector will not apply to 2008). Consequently, applicable
to the entire path, fiscal adjustments will be implemented
under higher government revenue centralisation (and
redistribution) ratios in contrast with what is contained in
the Convergence Programme, and this could curb
economic growth because of the higher-than-expected tax
burden.
According to our forecast, the deficit reduction in 2008-2009
will be based mostly on expenditure cuts. In addition to the
measures introduced to reduce current expenses on a long-
term path, in 2008 a sizeable reduction of one-off
expenditure items will be a significant factor in reducing the
deficit, estimated at 1.5 per cent of the GDP.
27
However, in
2009 these one-off items will have a lesser impact in reducing
expenditure, while the level of tax revenues relative to the
GDP will begin to decline if the level of tax evasion stops
declining and the inclusion of incomes from the informal
economy fails to continue.
28
For 2009 we have prepared a
conditional, rule-based forecast, containing only the
foreseeable impacts of the measures already announced.
Revenues
As a result of the measures taken by the government to
increase revenues, the level of revenues relative to GDP from
taxes and contributions increased during the fourth quarter
of 2006, and even more significantly in 2007, while at the
same time these measures are responsible for lower
consumption and for reductions in disposable income.
Consequently, the revenues of the general government from
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4.1. Developments in general government deficit
indicators
Preliminary actual Forecast
2006 2007 2008 2009
1. GFS balance -9.3 -6.0 -4.4 -3.9
2. Primary balance -5.5 -2.4 -0.9 -0.5
3. ESA balance adjustments 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.2
4. ESA balance (1+3) -9.2 -6.1 -4.0 -3.8
5. Quasi fiscal expenditures and other adjustments -0.7 -0.3 -1.5 -1.4
6. Augmented (SNA) balance (4+5) -9.9 -6.4 -5.5 -5.2
7. Augmented (SNA) primary balance -6.1 -2.5 -1.7 -1.6
8. Fiscal demand impact +2.6 -3.6 -0.8 -0.1
Note
ESA balance: Convergence programme -10.1 -6.8 -4.3 -3.2
Table 4-1
Fiscal deficit indicators in our baseline scenario 
(as a percentage of GDP)
27 These expenditure items include the recording of Gripen plane purchases, MÁV capital injection, costs of motorway construction including in the central budget,
one-off extraordinary budgetary subsidy provided to MÁV, the projected release of the unspent appropriations of budgetary chapters and units during 2007. 
28 Let us note that the Government also addressed this possibility in the 2006 Convergence Programme.
taxes and contributions – following the initial growth relative
to GDP – will take a downturn on the long run, which also
means that as of 2008 the revenues of the general
government (taxes and contributions) will no longer be a
factor in the fiscal adjustments.
This year, due to higher wage improvements in the private
sector and the fact that consumption expenditure declined
less than previously expected, the macroeconomic path
produces extra tax revenues for the general government. In
our forecast, we assumed that the surplus in tax revenues
shown for 2007 will begin to decline relative to GDP, due
fundamentally to tax bases (real wages and consumption)
failing to expand in parallel with GDP. As the growth rate of
purchased private and public consumption in the 2008-2009
period is expected to remain below the growth rate of GDP
at current prices, the rate of VAT revenues relative to GDP
will also begin to decline. The rate of reduction, however,
will be less steep than previously expected, and according to
our estimate VAT revenues will decline by 0.1-0.2 percentage
points of GDP during the next two years.
In 2007, revenues from social contributions were
significantly higher than projected, with revenues from
health insurance contributions taking the lead in this surplus.
This year the amount of contribution revenues that the
general government may realise could be as much as HUF
110 billion higher than it was previously expected. The
greater part of this extra revenue could be attributed to the
inclusion of incomes from the informal economy, and the
other part to the higher-than-projected wages. Accordingly,
the higher revenue path is attributed, to some extent, to the
fact that the impact of the reduction in tax evasion was
stronger than predicted, as it is also shown in the significantly
higher effective rates of healthcare contributions, which is an
indication of sizeable tax evasion.
29
As for revenues from
excise duties, efforts to push back the informal economy are
now a major factor, due largely to improved efficiency in tax
control.
In our view, the impact of efforts to combat the informal
economy will be prolonged, taking this into account as a
base effect in our baseline forecast for the prognosis of tax
and contribution revenues. At the same time, as far as profit
taxes are concerned, they frequently remained behind our
expectations during the year, and therefore we have
provided a conservative forecast for these taxes (corporate
tax, EVA).
Expenditures
During the first two years of fiscal adjustments, reductions in
so-called one-off items (motorway construction projects,
MÁV consolidation, Gripen purchase, etc.) had a major
impact in reducing the deficit. Previously, we estimated the
impact of one-off items for the improvement of balance
accounts in 2007 for around 1.0 per cent of GDP, however,
the government embarked on spending the extra revenues by
way of making payments which are also regarded as one-off
items.
30
The impact of these items will continue to be
considerable in 2008, we estimate that this type of reduction
of expenditures may improve the budget balance by around
1.5 per cent of GDP.
At the same time, it is apparent that the government managed
to make successful adjustments in some areas to reduce its
current expenditures. For example, in the central budget
tight expenditure control was introduced during the first nine
months, resulting in substantial differences in deficit trends
compared to what was seen in previous years, and most
expenditure limits remained unaffected on a time-
proportional basis. Furthermore, the fact that this year the
stock of the so-called unspent appropriations did not increase
also indicates tighter expenditure control measures, which
constitutes a major improvement compared to previous
years.
In 2007, the government sector’s objective for the reduction
of public employment appears to materialise, but public
sector wages are likely to exceed the figures shown in the
Convergence Programme, particularly from 2008 onwards,
and the risk of higher wage path appears to pertain to 2009
as well.
Sizeable fiscal adjustment took place in connection with the
subsidies of pharmaceutical products. At the end of 2006,
the act on the supply of pharmaceutical products paved the
way for a sustainable path of cutting costs, and the system of
access and pricing (introduction of minimum price charged,
reference products, etc.) was also amended. Additional
measures (e.g. prescription control, upper limit for subsidies,
etc.) support the long-term sustainability of subsidy
reduction. These measures, on the whole, not only decreased
the subsidies per consumption, but they also helped to
reduce consumption itself. According to our forecast, only
moderate increase is expected in the future in the volume of
subsidies provided for medicines, in other words, the
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29 Our projection, even though it is significantly higher than before, still contains a positive risk factor, in view of the fact that the number of non-contributors could be
reduced further, due in principle to closer ties between healthcare services and payments of contributions, to an unknown extent until the end of this year, or early
next year.
30 Extraordinary current subsidy to MÁV, furthermore, we assume that the stock of the so-called unspent appropriations accumulated during previous years will also be
reduced considerably this year.
adjustments to maintain the lower level of support appears
sustainable on the long run.
Major fiscal adjustments are taking place in the field of public
services. The key elements of the adjustment are increasing
prices and charges and decreasing price subsidies. These
measures are considered as permanent adjustments in several
areas (natural gas, utilities), and our budgetary baseline
forecast, in line with the forecast for regulated prices,
contains permanent reduction of these types of subsidies in
real terms.
In terms of impact and magnitude, substantial fiscal
adjustments are being implemented through the financing of
local governments. According to our estimate, in 2007 local
governments will receive less funds (approximately HUF 50
to 60 billion) from the central budget (they did not receive
any compensation for the surprise inflation), and this
tendency will continue in 2008 as well, as the real value of
central subsidies will be further reduced (thus fiscal
adjustments will have to be implemented in the education
and health sectors).
As far as medical treatment and preventive care is concerned,
fiscal adjustments were also introduced in 2007 to level out
expenditures in several different ways, however, in
consequence of the plans for easing the volume limits for
services next year, and their eventual elimination effective as
of 2009, expenditures may once again increase in real value.
Nevertheless, we do not have the necessary information at
our disposal to provide a more accurate assessment regarding
the impact of these measures. Accordingly, it is highly
uncertain whether or not the efforts to cut expenditure in this
particular item can be sustained over the long run.
Despite the aforementioned successes in fiscal adjustment, it
is apparent that the government desires to spend some of
the extra tax revenues from 2007. We work on the
assumption that in 2008 the real incomes of employees
working in the public sector will not decrease any further,
in other words the freezing of wages in the public sector for
two years, as planned, will not materialise. As the
Convergence Programme promises higher real incomes for
2009 in the public sector, it would require considerable cuts
in purchases of goods and services and other expenditures
in order to achieve the deficit objective for 2009 (there is
no room for the government to cut investment spending in
real value). Since the future measures to be taken by the
government to implement the necessary reductions in costs
in 2009 (announced and fixed in legal regulations) are still
unknown, we cannot take them into consideration for our
baseline forecast.
31
The 2008 budget
The draft of the 2008 budget act indicates a 4.1 per cent
ESA deficit objective. According to this bill, the criteria
recommended by the European Commission in connection
with the surplus primary balance, which was taken into
consideration in the Convergence Programme, will be
satisfied next year.
32
According to our baseline forecast the
ESA deficit next year will be 4.0 per cent, accompanied by
risk factors pointing slightly towards a higher deficit. The
interest balance shown in our baseline forecast is better than
contained in the bill, and the estimated interest balance may
FISCAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 2007 57
31 The Government shall have the opportunity to cut back and moderate expenditures in the various budget chapters and institutions in the bill for the 2009 budget,
however, this is merely a presumption, the expected impacts of which are addressed in our risk assessment.
32 According to the recommendation of the European Commission, when calculating the primary balance of the Maastricht balance indicator, only interest payments
shall be excluded instead of interest balance. The requirement for the primary balance in surplus on a cash-flow basis of the central government, as specified in the
bill for the control of public finances, is not satisfied (Parliament is yet to adopt the act for the control of public finances; according to the bill, the rule for real debts
is set to enter into force in 2011).
According to our baseline forecast, this year the ESA deficit could
decrease below the level indicated in the Convergence Programme by
around 0.7 per cent of GDP. The substantial improvement in the deficit
results mostly from the amount of revenues, as these turned out higher
than expected. Compared to our projection in the May Report, tax and
social contribution revenues may be 0.4 per cent higher relative to GDP
in 2007. Some of this is the result of the economic cycle taking a
different path than previously anticipated, therefore the wage
adjustments in the private sector were less accommodative than
previously anticipated. The other part of the extra revenues related to
efforts to combat the tax evasion. Apparently, the central budget has
embarked on a higher revenue path than projected in the Convergence
Programme. In the May Report we estimated the ESA deficit to be 6.0
per cent this year: the extra revenues would have the potential to
reduce the deficit to around 5.5 per cent of GDP, but in the meantime
the government has approved additional budgetary expenditures (e.g.
MÁV, higher expenses for budgetary institutions), where the latter is
responsible for our central forecast of 6.1 per cent for 2007.
Box 4-1: Which factors are behind the change in our projection for the 2007 ESA budget deficit?
be 0.2 per cent lower relative to GDP than what the bill
envisages. All in all, the position we anticipate for the
central budget and extrabudgetary funds is better by 0.1
percentage point of GDP than that shown in the bill. Our
forecast for the position of the social security funds is
practically the same as that of the government, and
according to our forecast, the deficit of local governments
will be 0.1 per cent higher relative to GDP, compared to
what is contained in the bill.
As for tax and contribution revenues, our forecast relating to
indirect taxes is at about the same level as the revenue
forecast in the budget bill, and in respect of profit taxes our
estimate is slightly more conservative, due mostly to the base
effect and the slight difference between the forecast for
economic growth.
The position of the social security funds is predicted to be
close to balance and demands special attention. The fiscal
adjustment measures intended to increase revenues focused
on improving the balance of the social security funds.
Consequently, in 2007 they may produce a surplus, and the
impacts of these measures are likely to sustain the position
close to balance in 2008 as well (whereas for 2009 we foresee
a deficit of 0.2 per cent of GDP).
As for the net expenditures of budgetary units and the
various chapters, we applied the figures contained in the bill
for the purposes of our forecast, because, contrary to what
we have seen in the past years, we expect that the
appropriations could be met in 2008. The budget proposals
for 2008 indicate that expenditures related to capital
formation are still historically low, although the budget
contains a more significant, but unclassified expense item
that, if used, may modify the overall picture.
In our view, the local government sector constitute a
significant risk factor in the implementation of the 2008
budget. Local governments are forced to introduce further
fiscal adjustments due to the reduction of funds from the
central budget, meaning that the loss in real value of
subsidies must be compensated by the sector on its own.
The sector’s ability to react to such tightening measures is
not known. Further risks might come from the assumed
budgeting of MÁV, the Hungarian state railways company.
The subsidies provided to MÁV will also be cut significantly
next year, which leaves the question as to whether
reorganisation of the company will be able to compensate
for these cuts in funding.
Risk distribution in our baseline forecast, 2007-2009
Description of the model simulation
A fiscal fan chart to demonstrate the uncertainties
surrounding the fiscal path was first published in our May
Report. Interpretation of the ranges is consistent with the
interpretation of the ranges contained in the inflation and
GDP fan charts.
We prepared the distribution of uncertainty with model
simulations, as it ensures that the distribution of items which
are tied to macroeconomic variables – on the revenue side
particularly VAT, personal income taxes, corporate taxes and
social security contributions, and on the expenditure side
pensions – is consistent with the distribution of the
determining variables. In the cases of inflation and GDP, we
used the probability factors contained in the fan charts drawn
up for these variables, whilst for the other macro-variables
we relied on symmetrical uncertainty factors and the variance
calculated from the historical forecasting errors. As for the
other items of the whole general government deficit – the
most important of which are the expenditures of the central
budget – the distribution of uncertainty was determined by
the experts who prepared the baseline forecast.
Distribution of uncertainty for the 2007-2009 period
The risks inherent in forecasting the deficit are shown in the
chart below. The distribution around the baseline forecast
shows marginal downside risk for 2007, while the risks point
toward a greater deficit for 2008 and 2009.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • NOVEMBER 200758
Chart 4-1
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As for the driving factors behind the distribution, the
uncertainties surrounding the macro path point towards a
lower deficit for all three years: although growth carries
downside risks, the deficit reducing (revenue increasing)
impact of inflation, if it was higher than predicted in the
baseline forecast, will offset this effect.
In 2007, the distribution of expert items of the central budget
is symmetrical, while it points towards a higher deficit for
2008 and 2009. There are several reasons for the asymmetry
predicted for next year. On the one hand, there is uncertainty
concerning the ability of local governments to adopt to the
reduction of standard subsidies in terms of real value, and on
the other hand, it is conceivable that the substantial reduction
of support to MÁV, as projected in the baseline forecast, will
not be carried out to the extent planned. In our opinion, the
baseline forecast for revenues from excise taxes and social
security expenditures indicates a risk factor of a smaller value
that however, points towards a higher deficit. The tilt shown
in the 2009 forecast that points towards a higher deficit
originates from the uncertainty involved in the risk of
implementation of measures for the reduction of
expenditures by budgetary institutions.
All in all, this year the symmetry of expert items constitutes
the major factor, whereas the macro path pointing towards a
lower deficit for 2008 and 2009 will only mitigate and will
not be able to eliminate the upside tilt shown in the expert
forecast.
If we were to compare our forecast to the objectives laid
down in the Convergence Programme, this year’s and next
year’s figures strongly appear feasible in terms of
fulfilment, but in 2009 the band covering sixty per cent of
the fan chart will be positioned above the target value in its
entirety.
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Low 90 Low 60 Low 30 High 30 High 60 High 90
2007 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.4
2008 3.0 3.5 3.8 4.3 4.6 5.1
2009 2.6 3.2 3.6 4.2 4.5 5.1
Table 4-2
Fan chart bands
According to the official figures, during the first half of 2007
the sum of the current account and capital account balance,
meaning the external financing requirement amounted to 5
per cent of GDP, similar to the level seen at the end of the
previous year.
34,35
After the considerable drop in the external
financing requirement in 2006, the reason why the
improvement in the external balance lost momentum during
the first half of 2007 was that the declining financing
requirement of the general government was offset by the
significant reduction in the net savings of households in
connection with consumption smoothing, and the slight
increase in financing requirement of the non-financial
corporate sector. The seasonal nature of EU transfers also
contributed to the temporary stabilisation in the external
financing requirement, as the majority of these items are
typically accounted during the second half of the year. The
reduction in the financing requirement of the consolidated
general government is attributed, first and foremost, to the
unexpectedly high revenues (VAT, personal income tax,
contributions and corporate tax), resulting from higher tax
bases and from improvements in the efficiency of tax
collection procedures. Households have smoothed the impact
of reductions in their real incomes by downsizing their
financial assets to a lesser extent, and by borrowing to a
larger extent, on account of which the savings of this sector
relative to GDP fell to 1.6 per cent.
Following the stabilisation early this year, in our opinion the
external balance will continue to improve in the second half
of 2007. In the wake of the fiscal measures introduced to
improve the central budget, the financing requirement of the
consolidated general government for 2007 will drop to 6.4
per cent of GDP according to our forecast.
36
The steady
decline in the net financing capacity of households since early
2006 slowed down by the end of 2007, which means that the
net annual savings within this sector could settle at around
1.7 per cent of GDP. On account of more intense investment
activity, the financing requirement of the corporate sector
relative to GDP may be a little higher than it was in 2006. As
a result of these trends, the external financing requirement of
the entire economy relative to GDP may decline
considerably, to 4.3 per cent and 6.1 per cent, respectively,
of the official top-down value and the ‘bottom-up’ measure
of the external financing requirement.
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4.2. External balance
Chart 4-2
Developments in the financing capacity of the
sectors*
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Corporate sector + error (“from below”)**
Corporate sector +error (“from above”)**
Government***
External financing capacity (“from above”)
External financing capacity (“from below”)
Households
* Adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on
account of EU accession and by the import increasing impact generated
by customs warehouses terminated due to EU accession and by the
Gripen purchases.
** The financing capacity of the corporate sector is determined as a
residual item, therefore, it contains the errors of other statistics as well.
*** In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government
includes local governments, the ÁPV Zrt., institutions discharging
quasi-fiscal duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest
Transport Limited [BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing
capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and
formally implemented under PPP schemes.
34 The scheduled revision of balance of payments for the 2005-2006 period took place in September of 2007, according to which the external financing requirement for
2006 was 0.7 per cent higher than previously expected, reaching 5.7 per cent of GDP, while the ‘bottom-up’ external financing requirement rose significantly in both
years.
35 During the first half of 2007 the methodological uncertainty in connection with the balance of payments statistics eased somewhat: the ‘Errors and omissions’ item
stood around EUR 1.1 billion, showing a considerable decline from the same period of 2006. Consequently, the ‘bottom-up’ external financing requirement dropped
marginally relative to the end of 2006.
36 Significant part of the improvement in the balance of the consolidated general government could materialise during the second half of the year. A major part of this
is due to the expenditures implemented for the upgrading and replacement of MÁV railway wagons, that we have accounted for the first half consistent with the
date of transfer from the central budget.
According to our expectations, the impact of consumption
smoothing to diminish household savings is likely to peak
during 2007, therefore, in 2008-2009 the reduction in the
financing requirement of the general government could
distinctly appear in the improvement of the external
balance. In line with the increasing household real
incomes, the net financing capacity of the household sector
may gradually return to where it stood before the fiscal
adjustment package. At the same time, parallel with
growing corporate investments the financing requirement
of the corporate sector may ultimately embark on an
upward path. All in all, for the period ending in 2009 we
expect to see the financing requirement of the general
government drop further by more than 1 percentage point
and a similar improvement in the external balance position
relative to GDP.
Regarding the structure of the current account balance, the
positive trend in the real economy balance lost momentum
during the first half of 2007, attributable to import demand
induced by intense consumption smoothing and growing
investments, and to the temporary setback of exports during
the second quarter. Nevertheless, in the second half of 2007
in our opinion the real economy balance will continue to
improve, and if the favourable economic activity in Europe
continues, the balance of goods and services could continue
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* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, the ÁPV Zrt., institutions discharging quasi-fiscal
duties (MÁV, BKV), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and formally implemented
under PPP schemes.
** During the 2004-2007 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics point toward a higher current account deficit and a higher
external financing requirement.
*** In our forecast for the ‘errors and omissions’ item of the balance of payments we assumed that the cumulated figure for the last four quarters will
remain unchanged.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Estimation Forecast
I. Consolidated general government* -8.7 -8.3 -8.4 -7.3 -9.9 -6.4 -5.5 -5.2
II. Households 2.7 0.2 2.4 4.2 3.2 1.7 2.1 2.8
Corporate sector and “error” (= A - I.- II. ) -0.8 0.1 -2.1 -2.9 0.9 0.4 0.1 -0.4
A. External financing capacity, “from above”(=B+C )** -6.7 -8.0 -8.1 -6.0 -5.7 -4.3 -3.3 -2.8
B. Current account balance** -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.8 -6.5 -5.5 -5.3 -5.2
– in EUR billions** -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.0 -5.8 -5.7 -5.9 -6.1
C. Capital account balance 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.1 2.4
D. Net errors and omissions (NEO)*** 0.3 0.3 -1.7 -2.8 -3.3 -1.9 -2.0 -1.9
External financing capacity, “from below” (=A+D) -6.4 -7.7 -9.8 -8.7 -9.0 -6.1 -5.3 -4.7
Table 4-3
GDP-proportionate net financing capacity of individual sectors
* The prognosis includes in 2006-2007 the import resulting from the Hungarian Army’s Gripen fighter lease, amounting to close to 0.3 per cent of the
GDP.
** During the 2004-2009 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics point toward higher current account deficit and higher
external financing requirement.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fact/Preliminary fact Forecast
1. Balance of goods and services ** -1.5 -2.4 -3.8 -2.7 -0.5 0.4 1.9 2.2 2.4
2. Income balance -5.4 -5.4 -4.9 -6.0 -6.5 -7.3 -7.8 -7.9 -8.0
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
I. Current account balance (1+2+3)** -6.1 -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.8 -6.5 -5.5 -5.3 -5.2
Current account balance in EUR billions** -3.6 -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.0 -5.8 -5.7 -5.9 -6.1
II. Capital account balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.1 2.4
External financing capacity (I+II)** -5.5 -6.7 -8.0 -8.1 -6.0 -5.7 -4.3 -3.3 -2.8
Table 4-4
GDP-proportionate structure of the current account balance* 
(relative to GDP, per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
to be an important driving force behind the reduction of the
external imbalance. The GDP-proportionate deficit of the
income balance may increase slightly, partly due to the
increase in expenditures linked to debt-type investments,
notably because, despite the lower external financing
requirement, the growth of external indebtedness of the
economy will not stop before 2009.
Financing the current account deficit
During the first half of 2007, the ‘bottom-up’ external
financing requirement was around EUR 3.8 billion, exceeding
7.5 per cent of the six-month GDP. The financing structure
of the balance of payments underwent unfavourable
developments from the standpoint of investors, since the
outflow of non-debt creating sources was over EUR 2.5
billion, which resulted in a record high influx of debt creating
financing. This materialized predominantly in the form of
Hungarian banks borrowing funds from and issuing bonds
abroad, while the volume of foreign borrowing in the
corporate sector has also increased significantly. There were
both clearly identifiable individual factors and more or less
permanent trends that had a major role in the massive
outflow of non-debt creating funds:
• The stock of direct capital investments of foreign investors
declined significantly, mainly due to one-off factors. First,
this may be attributed to the change in ownership of
Budapest Airport and to the ensuing changes in the
company’s financing structure. Second, foreign investors
withdrew more than EUR 420 million from their
investments in Hungarian shares, linked for the most part
to MOL’s share repurchases.
• Similarly to 2006, local institutional investors made
significant investments in foreign portfolio shares.
Furthermore, resident companies once again made
considerable direct capital investments abroad, worth close
to EUR 1.4 billion.
As regards the structure of financing, we anticipate a massive
outflow of non-debt creating funds for the whole year as well.
In the case of direct capital investments, the outflow of capital
may moderately exceed the inflow, due to changes in the
financing structure of Budapest Airport. As far as portfolio
shares are concerned, the volume of net outflow may exceed
EUR 2.5 billion, where two factors are likely to have a
dominating role: on the one hand, we expect that local
institutional investors will continue to buy foreign shares, and
on the other hand – due primarily to MOL transactions – the
Hungarian equity portfolios of foreign investors may drop
significantly. Let us point out that the growing trend of resident
investors purchasing foreign equity portfolios and their direct
capital investments could have a positive impact on the income
balance over the long run, and hence improve the chances of
long-term sustainability of the balance of payments.
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